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ABSTRACT

Designed to provide a general assessment of the rapidly growing applied humanities movement in the United States, this report sets forth issues found to be central to an assessment of current work in the applied humanities, presents a general survey of the nature of applied work in a variety of disciplines, and offers conclusions and observations about how high-quality work in applied humanities can be nurtured and supported in the future. The first of seven sections presents an introduction to issues surrounding the applied humanities movement. The second section examines basic features of current debates related to the humanities by examining three historical developments--Greek thought in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.; individualism and the reaction against tradition emerging after the Reformation in the West in the 17th and 18th centuries; and professionalization and institutionalization, which began toward the end of the 19th century, reaching maturity during the 20th century. Section 3, "Current Work in Applied Humanities," discusses philosophy, applied and public history, and literature. Section 4 presents models of application while section 5 deals with fields of application--specifically the humanities and the biomedical sciences, humanities and the social sciences, and public policy and the policy sciences. Academic preparation and disciplinary standards are the focus of the next section. The final section summarizes the hopes, problems, and needs of the humanities as a serious discipline of study. (LH)

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On the Uses of the Humanities: Vision and Application

A REPORT BY THE HASTINGS CENTER

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INSTITUTE OF SOCIETY, ETHICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES

INSTITUTE OF SOCIETY, ETHICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES
THE HASTINGS CENTER

360 Broadway, Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y. 10706

The Hastings Center was established in 1969 to address the ethical problems of rapid developments in medicine, biology and the behavioral sciences. Increasingly of late, in addition to those interests it has been concerned with problems of professional ethics and with the teaching of ethics in undergraduate and professional schools. Located in Hastings-on-Hudson, New York, The Hastings Center carries out research in such areas as death and dying, genetic counseling and engineering, behavior control, health policy, public policy, the foundations of ethics, and professional ethics.

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Contents

Preface vi

Contributors to the Project ix

1. Introduction 1

2. Historical Conflicts and Conceptions 7

Greek Roots 8
Individualism and Tradition 11
Professionalizing the Humanities 12

3. Current Work in Applied Humanities 14

Philosophy 15
Applied and Public History 18
Literature 22

4. Models of Application 28

Vision and Tradition 34

5. Fields of Application: The Biomedical, the Social, and the Policy Sciences 36

The Humanities and the Biomedical Sciences 36
The Humanities and the Social Sciences 42
Public Policy and the Policy Sciences 45

6. Academic Preparation and Disciplinary Standards 53

Academic and Disciplinary Standards 56

7. The Humanities: Hopes, Problems, and Needs 62

Notes 66

Citations for Boxed Quotations 73

Preface

What is the cultural mission of the humanities? How directly can their knowledge and perspectives be brought to bear on public policy issues? What civic purposes can—and should—the humanities serve? Does the humanist's vocation lie in the public realm of action and practical affairs, or in the private realm of contemplation and detached scholarship—or some delicate combination of both?

Those old questions have had no historically fixed answers. They have been asked and answered in various ways, first in ancient Greece, again during the Renaissance, yet again in the nineteenth century, and once more in our own times. How those questions are posed and answered over time reveals the dynamic nature of the humanities, providing as well an insight into the exceedingly complex relationship between the humanities and the social, cultural, and political contexts within which humanistic inquiry takes place.

In the last decade, questions about the social role and future prospects of the humanities have arisen with renewed force and urgency. Scholars and teachers in philosophy, history, literary studies, and the other humanistic disciplines have been reassessing their intellectual and educational role. Humanists* working both within academic settings and outside the university have been seeking new ways to address the social issues of our time by drawing on the special insights and resources of their fields of learning. They have begun directing the knowledge and methods of their disciplines to contemporary social issues, not only in traditional classroom settings and in their published work, but also by working directly with policymakers and professional practitioners. Public policy issues, scientific and technological developments, and the social role of the professions are all topics that raise questions of perennial human concern—questions of ethics, history, cultural meaning, and individual self-identity that are woven into the increasingly complex fabric of our common life in modern society.

The humanities have tried to illuminate such questions by drawing on the cultural traditions of the past, by critical reflection, and by imaginative creation. The new challenges posed by modern society make the need for that illumination all the more profound and urgent. The issue is not whether the humanities will be used and applied, but how wisely, rigorously, and well their application will be carried out.

Since its founding in 1969, The Hastings Center has worked to shed light on the ethical and value issues arising out of recent developments in the biological, medical, and behavioral sciences. Its work has ranged over ethical problems of death and dying, population limitation, genetic counseling and engineering, behavior control, health policy, and professional ethics. In these areas and others, the Center has sought to bring humanists, scientists, lawyers, physicians, and policymakers together for dialogue and interdisciplinary study. Throughout, the Center's work has been guided by a firm belief in the enduring value of the humanities to the civic life of our society and by a desire to find a more satisfactory relationship between the sciences and the humanities. In the late

* By "humanist" we wish to identify those who work, teach, or write in the various fields of the humanities. We are not referring to that historical and cultural movement called "humanism."

1960s, the Center was something of a pioneer in the field of applied ethics. Before long, however, we were joined by a rapidly growing number of individual scholars and research centers working on related topics of applied and professional ethics. The fields of applied and public history emerged during this period as well. By the late seventies, many private foundations, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the state humanities councils were actively supporting such work. What we will be calling the "applied humanities" had come into their own. But that emergence has not been without confusion and controversy. The time has come to attempt a general assessment of the rapidly growing applied humanities movement in this country. That is the purpose of this document.

In the spring of 1981, the Center began a two-and-one-half-year research project on the Applied Humanities and Public Policy, supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. That project gave us an opportunity to take stock of the applied work now underway in several fields, to assess the circumstances under which applied studies in the humanities tend to flourish and make productive contributions, and to identify the problems and pitfalls that, in some instances, have made applied work in the humanities less illuminating and rigorous than it ought to be. More generally, we stepped back from a consideration of our own ongoing work to ask some basic questions about the relationship between disciplinary scholarship and applied studies in the humanities, and about the models of "application" that seem most pertinent to the humanities. Those questions quickly led in turn to other, equally perplexing issues about the nature of theoretical knowledge in the humanities, as well as to identifying appropriate standards for evaluating work in the applied humanities. Along the way we found it useful to compare the latter with applied work in other fields, such as the natural and the social sciences. We also explored the linkages that do—or could—exist between the humanities and the biomedical, social, and policy sciences.

From 1981 to 1983 we surveyed the literature, held six extended conferences, conducted a number of discussions and interviews, and commissioned more than thirty papers. The papers explored the goals and methods of applied studies in the humanities, the history of efforts to formulate proper roles for the humanities, and the intellectual standards that scholarship and educational programs in the applied humanities should meet. Our meetings produced lively and sometimes heated discussions. They brought out clearly the tensions and suspicions that still exist between "disciplinary" and "applied" humanists, and they revealed some interesting differences in perspective among those doing applied work in various fields. If we did not eliminate these tensions, we believe that we did succeed in focusing and placing them in a clearer perspective.

The report that follows is an outcome of that work. It sets forth the issues we found to be central to an assessment of current work in the applied humanities, presents a general survey of the nature of applied work in a variety of disciplines, and offers our main conclusions and observations about how high-quality work in applied humanities can be nurtured and supported in the future. We did not attempt to achieve a tight, precise consensus among ourselves, only a general agreement; no member of our project would necessarily agree with every

sentence in this report. We felt we neither could nor should lay out hard-and-fast prescriptions for work in the applied humanities or for educational programs designed to prepare students to carry out such work. But we did study the issues carefully, talked and argued at length for over two years, and developed what we believe to be the first general analysis ever undertaken of the applied humanities as a whole. It is that analysis that we present here. The various boxed passages, examples, and quotations are meant not only to help flesh out an occasionally general and abstract text, but also to convey some of the flavor that has accompanied recent debates. The various citations in the footnotes should enable the reader to find adequate further reading.

This report draws upon many sources. Perhaps the most important among them are the various papers and studies commissioned for the project, a number of which will appear in a companion volume, *Applying the Humanities*, edited by Daniel Callahan, Arthur L. Caplan, and Bruce Jennings (New York: Plenum Press, forthcoming, 1985). They pursue in greater detail the issues that can only be summarized or alluded to here.

We would like to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities for the support that allowed us to conduct this study. In particular we extend our thanks to Ms. Arnita Jones, Program Officer at the Endowment, for her helpful advice, generous encouragement, and constructive criticism throughout the course of this enlightening, but sometimes exasperating research project.

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Finally, we would like to thank most heartily those who attended our meetings, wrote papers, and served as critics and commentators on the papers written by others. None of them are to be held responsible for any errors of fact or judgment that may appear in this report. But we hope they will be willing to take partial responsibility for whatever insight the report may contain.

The following list of contributors to the project includes those who were permanent members of the group that carried out this study and are responsible for this report, those who wrote papers, and those who took part in at least one of the meetings we held.

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1. Introduction

To imagine a human body needing neither food nor water requires a difficult feat of imagination. It is no less difficult to imagine a civilized human culture not needing history, philosophy, and literature. Those fields, and the humanities more broadly, provide cultures with the intellectual nourishment necessary for their survival and vitality. To be sure, any culture can suffer from a corrupting history, or from values that warp and debase its civic life, or from a literature that poisons the imagination. Yet a culture cannot endure at all without a historical memory, a set of values that gives coherence to its activities, and a literature that is expressive of its conscious self-conception, its unconscious fantasies and desires.

In their absence, there is no meaningful human life at all, and certainly nothing that can be called a society or a community. That remains true even in the face of a powerful scientific ethos and a bureaucratic state. For all of the social impact of the sciences, their meaning and significance cannot be determined until they have been critically interpreted; and the resources of the humanities provide a way of doing so. For all of the potency of the bureaucratic state to shape behavior, it is historical context, evaluative and expressive interpretations, and the restlessness of the willful imagination that will set public goals and give color to its civic flesh.

This is only to articulate once again the enduring case for the humanities and their centrality in a shared political and cultural life. Yet for all the permanent validity of that case, it needs continually to be explored afresh. In recent years, as in their long past, the humanities have all been subject to internal strife and competing self-definitions. At the least, they are not identical with, or as narrow or tightly compartmentalized as, the academic disciplines that encompass them. But what is their scope and role? This report addresses a question in the humanities that is at once new and yet filled with echoes from the past. *To what extent, and in what way, and with what voice, ought the humanities to address our social, political, and economic life?*[1] To put the issue another way, does it make any sense to speak of an "applied humanities," one whose intent is not only personal insight or theoretical knowledge, but practical and prudential contributions to matters of social and public life?

Those questions are as old as ancient Greece and as fresh as the charges leveled by the Heritage Foundation in 1980 that the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) had betrayed the humanities by trying to force them to address political topics.[2] The context of our interest in the subject is both personal and professional. Most (though not all) of those who joined us for our inqui-

ry were trained in one of the disciplines of the humanities, but have in recent years focused some of their work on matters of public policy or general social concern. As often as not, their intended audience has been not only their academic peers in the humanities, but physicians, or lawyers, or legislators, or the general public. Their chosen topics of study or teaching or writing are not what Richard Wasserstrom has called the "set problems" of academic scholarship,[3] but issues of more immediate public concern—health and illness, crime and punishment, war and peace, poverty and affluence. Many in the humanities have found that kind of work congenial and enriching. It has promised and often provided fresh stimulation for those concerns and problems that drew them to the humanities in the first place. The desire to bring humanistic resources to bear on questions of public concern and social policy is an invigorating challenge.

But a desire to get at such questions in a fresh and more direct way raises some basic issues about the nature of work in the humanities. Is it the case, as some have charged, that those humanists who work on social and policy questions have trespassed on issues well beyond their professional training and competence?[4] Or simply trafficked in the faddish? Apart from those accusations, is it nonetheless possible that many in recent years have tried to do with the humanities that which is better left to other fields? At times some of our own colleagues have said that, but just as often the criticism has come from bemused policy analysts or legislators. Moreover, early efforts to join the humanities and public policy were not always successful. During the mid-1970s, the NEH instructed the various state humanities councils to give priority to public policy issues in making their local grants. That ruling led to considerable confusion.[5] Just what exactly do the humanities have to contribute to urban housing problems, or transportation tangles, or the provision of health care? It led as well to at least some projects that were simultaneously neither of great use to public policy nor wholly faithful to the humanities.

Those who took part in our project have at times felt chastened by their own failures, embarrassed by the ineptitude of some speaking in the name of a still immature field, and often uncertain how best to characterize and justify what it is they want to do. An adequate historical account of the emergence of this new direction in the humanities is often no less rough and groping.

It is tempting, for example, to explain the recent developments in terms of the much-discussed "crisis" within the humanities during the past few years. Its dimensions encompass a bleak job outlook, declining enrollment in humanities courses, the lack of a collective self-consciousness in the humanities, low public (and often private) self-esteem, and a distressing resurgence of vocationalism and preprofessionalism in the colleges. Yet the actual origins of such relatively new fields as biomedical ethics, or public history, or the teaching of literature in graduate professional schools antedate that crisis. And while some humanists have found employment in such formerly unlikely places as medical schools, legislatures, and corporations, their number is insignificant in the face of the generally dismal employment situation in the humanities. For all of the media attention given to the fact that some philosophers now work in medical schools and hospitals, their nationwide number

is probably less than a hundred.

Our own interest in the subject, in any case, focuses on the nature of the humanities and their potential for direct application to practical life or public policy. The economic situation of those in the humanities may well have served as a stimulus to the notion of an "applied" humanities. Yet it is no less likely that repugnance at a widespread professionalization of the disciplines—a desire to give them more breathing room both within and outside of the academy—has been a no less important influence. Whatever the reason for the interest, however, it is the validity and future of that development that are our principal concerns. Inevitably, many of our examples in this report will be drawn from the fields of history and philosophy. Comparatively speaking, they have seen the most activity. However, other fields, particularly literature, show every sign of similar stirrings.

The phrase that we have used to open this discussion—"applied humanities"—is by no means graceful or felicitous, nor is its meaning self-evident. It might at once be argued that the humanities do not lend themselves to making, say, a distinction between "theoretical" and "applied" as is commonly the case in scientific disciplines (and that is an issue we will take up). Nonetheless, we found it useful to employ the term, at least heuristically, as a means of focusing attention and analysis on the ways in which the humanities may or could more directly contribute to social inquiry or public policy. The virtue of the phrase is that it helps to specify a set of interests and predilections for which no comparable traditional phrase exists. One could also speak of a "public humanities," that is, a humanities directed to a public rather than academic audience; or a "practical humanities," that is, an interest in immediate, pragmatic problems. Those phrases convey some of the currents that circulate in the field and capture different, though by no means exclusive, emphases.

Yet no single phrase seems quite adequate to encompass the full range of activities now carried out in the name of the humanities. The range encompassed by these various purposes can be illustrated by simply listing a sample of them: using literature in the education of medical students; employing historical research to defend Indian land claims; testifying as philosophers or historians before congressional committees on risk/benefit analysis, genetic engineering, immigration policy, health insurance plans, nuclear waste disposal, and welfare policy; using techniques of literary interpretation to analyze the language of the law; teaching courses in medical or public policy or environmental ethics; writing corporate or local histories, or serving as a historian to the U.S. Senate; analyzing concepts of "autonomy" and "responsibility," "guilt" and "culpability"; organizing a local history exhibit to illuminate a land-use controversy; serving on an institutional review board to examine research on human subjects.

The characteristic focus of the humanities has been on understanding and interpreting human life, whether historically, culturally, philosophically, or linguistically. While such understandings and interpretations will often have implications for behavior, their explicit purposes have not ordinarily been seen as directed toward action. Instead, the humanities concentrate on preserving and interpreting the literature of the past, on analyzing questions of the general nature of values and morality, and on understanding the meaning and signifi-

Joining the Issues

. . . a contemporary phenomenon [is] the rash of moral philosophers who are ready to solve contemporary problems for us—ready to resolve issues concerning vegetarianism, animal rights, nuclear deterrents, and our obligations to future generations, among others—by means of arguments that, so to speak, prove too much. These arguments are typically aprioristic in style, and yield conclusions far stronger than any consensus reasonable men and women are able to arrive at today. I share a deep distrust of this style of moral philosophy.

Hilary Putnam

Students spend less time thinking about technical questions of meta-ethics and more time grappling with the moral issues of the day. Courses in ethics are more "relevant" and students are more "involved." It may even be true that these courses are doing some good; perhaps students learn something; perhaps their powers of analysis are improved. (Probably not!) But students in such courses are not really studying philosophy.

Gilbert Harman

. . . it is possible "for philosophers to detach themselves so completely from primary materials that they no longer offer commentaries on science or law or education but instead merely give us commentaries on the commentaries on the commentaries. Philosophy then becomes an exchange among members of a closed club who live by taking in one anothers' laundry and have forgotten the original business—human inquiry, human practice, human choices and hopes—that once aroused their common attention."

Charles Frankel

How did the fresh attention that philosophers began paying to the ethics of medicine, beginning around 1960, move the ethical debate beyond relativism and subjectivism? In place of the earlier concern with attitudes, feelings, and wishes, it substituted a new preoccupation with situations, needs, and interests; it required writers on applied ethics to go beyond the discussion of general principles and rules to a more scrupulous analysis of the particular kinds of "cases" in which they find their application; . . . and, finally, it pointed philosophers back to the ideas of "equity," "reasonableness," and "human relationships," which played central roles in the *Ethics* of Aristotle but subsequently dropped out of sight.

Stephen Toulmin

I am disposed to agree with what has been surmised by others, that the opportunity which my official position gave me of learning by personal observation the necessary conditions of the practical conduct of public affairs, has been of considerable value to me as a theoretical reformer of the opinions and institutions of my time. . . . the occupation accustomed me to see and hear the difficulties of every course, and the means of obviating them, stated and discussed deliberately with a view to execution; it gave me opportunities of perceiving when public measures, and other political facts, did not produce the effects which had been expected of them, and from what causes; above all, it was valuable to me by making me, in this portion of my activity, merely one wheel in a machine, the whole of which had to work together. . . . I was thus in a good position for finding out by practice the mode of putting a thought which gives it easiest admittance into minds not prepared for it by habit; while I became practically conversant with the difficulties of moving bodies of men, the necessities of compromise, the art of sacrificing the non-essential to preserve the essential.

John Stuart Mill

cance of the human historical record. The humanities, as is often said, are principally concerned with the great texts of the past,[6] though one can think of many aspects of the humanities that would be no less concerned with present questions and contemporary texts. But even that latter point is still a long way from entailing that the humanities can provide direct assistance in solving current social problems, or in proposing future political or even cultural directions. Many in the humanities would specifically reject that role.

From a variety of perspectives, then, the idea of an applied humanities can seem both odd in itself and a threat to what many take to be the central work of the humanities. There are a number of important questions that need to be pursued in trying to unravel the problem. What does or might it mean to "apply" the humanities? Is there something inherent in the nature of the humanities—if they are to remain true to themselves—that should make them resistant to the notion of application? Or is there a sense in which they have always been applied? If an "applied humanities" is not a self-contradictory term why, then, has there been considerable resistance to the idea, or at least uneasiness about it? Is that resistance simply a historical accident?

In trying to answer those questions, it is also informative to compare the relative acceptability of applied work in the humanities with its place in other fields. One cannot, for example, help being struck by the stance of the scientific community toward applied technological inquiry. While work in theoretical science has a higher academic status than is the case with, say, engineering, the sciences have long learned to live with, and positively embrace, the idea that science is appropriately both theoretical and applied. Quite the opposite seems to be more characteristic of the humanities, where many believe that a space, a careful gap, ought to exist between the humanities and the practical solution of political, social, and cultural problems.

Yet even if that gap can be bridged, a further question arises. What would be acceptable disciplinary and other academic criteria for an applied humanities? A considerable source of uneasiness among those resistant to an applied humanities is that its practitioners may do harm to the humanities by diluting scholarly standards. Can that danger be avoided? Moreover, if there is to be a successful applied humanities, would that have implications for the training of those who propose to point their career in that direction? The answer would seem to be yes, but the practical implications of that intuition are by no means clear.

While we want to analyze the notion of an applied humanities for its own sake, we believe it to be important also to open some extended discussion with representatives of those disciplines that have long taken it to be a central part of their mission to deal with (and often to solve) social and political problems. We start with the premise that those from the humanities may have much to contribute directly to policy questions. But perhaps they can make no less significant a contribution (though of a more indirect kind) by working closely with other fields more traditionally oriented toward such matters, such as the biological, the social, and the policy sciences.

There is, we believe, no good reason why the contributions of the humanities to exigent national problems ought to be overshadowed by other disciplines. At the least the question can be asked

whether that is a mere quirk of history or a valid sorting out of potential contributions. There is also no reason in principle why those from the humanities should feel diffident or insecure in the face of rising requests from the policy arena for a greater participation in policy analysis. The important point is that those possibilities should neither be rashly embraced nor precipitately declined. Everything will depend upon the way in which the humanities might or could or should be brought to bear. That range of possibilities will, in turn, be a function of the history and traditions of the humanities and the judgment to be passed on the various efforts now underway to join the humanities to national concerns.

2. *Historical Conflicts and Conceptions*

In legislation creating the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Arts in 1965, Congress declared the following as principal purposes of governmental support for the humanities:

> . . . a high civilization must not limit its efforts to science and technology alone but must give full value and support to the other great branches of man's scholarly and cultural activity in order to achieve a better understanding of the past, a better analysis of the present, and a better view of the future . . . democracy demands wisdom and vision in its citizens and . . . it must therefore foster and support a form of education designed to make men masters of their technology and not its unthinking servant.[7]

That formulation is noteworthy because it blends together in a brief compass several potentially competing conceptions of the humanities and what they can do. Congress, it appears, envisaged the humanities as a bridge between our past and our future, and charged them with apparently consistent, but in fact often conflicting, tasks. In one guise, they are the custodians of our cultural traditions and memory. They help us understand who we are in light of who we were. In another, they are the analysts of our present reality and predicaments, charged with the task of illuminating how the present is a unique and specific human moment, as well as how it is continuous with the past. In yet another guise the humanities are the educators of our utopian and critical imagination. They must nurture our aspirations for human progress and betterment. They must lift our attention above the confines of past practices and above the practical limitations that the need to cope with immediate problems imposes. That technology is singled out as a special problem hints at a long-standing tension between the humanities and the sciences, particularly that "applied" science which is technology.

The vision projected by Congress is correct and telling. The humanities encompass today, as they have in the past, a volatile blend of traditionalism, pragmatism, and utopianism. They are distinguished from other branches of knowledge by their persistent recourse to both the backward-looking orientation of historical inquiry and the forward-looking orientation of prescriptive, normative aspiration. These varied impulses often pull in different directions. While each no doubt exists in every generation of humanistic discourse, each also tends to vie for dominance. Thus the tone and temperament of the humanities varies, becoming now conservative and tradition-regarding, now revolutionary and *avant garde*, and now dedicated to the Platonic (or Nietzschean) mission of turning the world upside down. While Congress acknowledged the legitimate place of all three of these elements, it either mistakenly assumed that they could naturally and serenely coexist, or

else wisely decided that it could not establish priorities among them.

In its formulation, moreover, Congress touched upon a second source of enduring tension (and vitality) in the humanities, that between their civic and their private mission, their outer and their inner concerns. The civic orientation is sounded first by placing the role of the humanities in the context of democratic citizenship, echoing in the political vocabulary of our own age the *leitmotif* of the Renaissance tradition of civic humanism. But this aspect is quickly muted by the central theme of two different traditions, liberalism and romanticism. There the humanities' principal contribution to democracy is said to be the preservation of human autonomy against the encroachments of technology,[8] that most social and visible of modern forces. In setting individual autonomy and protection against "unthinking servitude" as goals of the humanities, Congress echoed the traditionally private vocation of the humanities—the refinement of personal sensibility and insight—that also grew out of Renaissance humanism and its Stoic antecedents.

That brief congressional passage typifies the complex of meanings and emphases that reside in all of the most serious and thoughtful discussions of the humanities today. Defenders of the applied humanities naturally tend to select out a few of those emphases in order to orient their own work within a more general received understanding of what it means to be a humanist. They no less commonly tend to emphasize the pragmatic facets of the humanities with their orientation toward the distinctive and soluble problems of the present. They are inclined at the same time to stress the traditional civic, outward-looking vocation of the humanist.

Given this complex of meanings, it is not surprising that critics of the applied humanities are to be found across a broad spectrum of value commitments: critics on the right who emphasize the traditionalist face of the humanities, critics on the left who want its utopian, critical face to predominate, and those critics in the twentieth-century mainstream of the humanities—professional scholars who have inherited the liberal and romantic commitment to the humanities' private, inner-regarding vocation.[9] The tensions and the critical perspectives those critics generate are not new. They have always been a part of the gradually evolving understanding of the humanities in Western culture. The basic features of our own current debates first took shape during three particularly important historical periods.

Greek Roots

The first and in some ways most influential development took place in ancient Greek thought in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., where debate about the meaning and value of *paideia* gave shape to many elements in later Western conceptions of the humanities.[10] The traditional educational system of the Greek *polis* was built on an assumption that the basic purpose of education was to subserve the ends of the city. The young male in this culture received a rigidly controlled training in music, poetry, and athletics. The manifest purpose of this instruction was the cultivation of patriotism and civic virtue. No Athenian poet, dramatist, or historian could avoid the need to justify his work or art in terms of its contribution to these ends and, ultimately, to the well-being of the commu-

nity as a whole. The idea that the arts, philosophy, and history exist for their own sake, or for the sake of some separate nonpractical pleasure they provide, was entirely unknown at this period. We cannot even speak here of an "application" of these studies to public life. Application presupposes separation, and we see here, instead, a thoroughgoing fusion of study with public life and public ends.

Patterns for many of the later tensions in the humanities began to be found at the end of the fifth century. In the political and cultural crisis that beset Athens during and after its disastrous involvement in the Peloponnesian War, the basic conception of civic education was transformed, largely through the influence of Socrates and Plato.[11] In their work are the roots of subsequent debates, pitting arguments about the *instrumental* value of the arts and humanities against arguments for their *intrinsic* value.

For Socrates and Plato, philosophical inquiry and other parts of education were valuable as ways to practical ends set up and articulated from outside by the city. They were valuable in further ways as well. They also contributed to the inquirer's ability to deliberate about the ends of human life themselves, leading him to a more refined or more cohesive account of the values basic to a living of the best human life. To restrict philosophy to a merely instrumental role would be to deprive it of one of its most significant practical contributions, its assistance in pressing, and answering, our deepest questions about who we are and how we ought to live.[12] These inquiries were valuable additionally because they were themselves constituent parts of the good human life, having a value in their own right as excellent things for a human being to choose to do. Building on Socrates' claim that the unexamined life is not worth living, and on his lifelong practice of dialectical inquiry into the nature of the basic human values, Plato coherently altered the extremely instrumentalist and utilitarian conception of intellectual study held by his culture without wholly severing the connection of inquiry with broader social goals and purposes. He argued, indeed notoriously, that philosophers—just in virtue of their *paideia* and philosophical study—would be the best rulers for a human city.

This synthesis is preserved in a more complicated and ambiguous fashion in Aristotle's work. Like Plato he insisted on the usefulness of various forms of intellectual endeavor; and maintained that their value in our lives is not exhausted by instrumental usefulness. But in an important and influential break with previous tradition, Aristotle cast the question of intrinsic value in a new light by separating the forms of inquiry into two broad groups: those whose end is the improvement of some aspect of practical life (for example, medicine, literature, the study of ethics, politics, and history), and those that have as their end only theoretical understanding (mathematics, astronomy, the nonethical parts of philosophy). The former can contribute to practice both instrumentally and through their contribution to our understanding of our practical ends. The latter are constituent parts of the best human life, and thus practical in that sense; but they do not subserve any other ends outside themselves. To Aristotle, then, we can trace our modern idea of pure inquiry—and the problems of interrelation and application that arise with the birth of that idea. It is conspicuous that, for Aristotle, all the studies that we group

under the humanities were of the practical and not the purely theoretical type. Nonetheless, his conception of scientific inquiry had a decisive influence on evolving conceptions of humanistic study at a later period.

By the time of Epicurus even this uneasy synthesis between the intrinstic value of the humanities and the quality of common life in the polis had broken down, giving way to the beginning of the modern privatistic and individualistic conception of the humanities. In Epicurus a humanities education once more assumed the purely instrumental value that it had in the eyes of the defenders of the traditional *paideia*. Only now the ends it served were not those of the city but those of the inner man, the private self.[13] In this way, as Martha Nussbaum notes, Epicurus inaugurated "a characteristic modern picture of educational activity; namely, that it goes on in a place that is a sanctuary from public life, protected from its stresses and its claims."[14]

The second pivotal juncture in the historical development of the humanities was, of course, the revival of classical learning that took place in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. During this period, the terms "humanist" and "humanity" came into modern usage to designate a separate form of study centering on the study of ancient Greek and Roman languages and literature, as well as ethical philosophy, rhetoric, grammar, and poetry.[15] Italian and European humanists in this period engaged in an enormous variety of activities, ranging from the production of accurate translations of classic texts to direct involvement in affairs of state; the latter were intended as direct applications of the humanities.

No simple account of the orientation of Renaissance humanism is possible. The extremely eclectic humanists did not represent a unified movement or world view. But in this very diversity Renaissance humanism consolidated most of the tensions and cross-currents that we have noted in the classical Greek period. Some influential thinkers, like Machiavelli and Guicardini, were pivotal in reviving Aristotelian and classical republican political theory and refining the earlier tradition of "civic humanism" that later became transmitted through seventeenth-century England to have an important impact on the American Revolution.[16] In a different way, Reformation leaders like John Calvin stimulated the public activist orientation of the humanities. Other early humanists, reviving Epicurean and Stoic philosophies, developed the more inward and private vocation of the humanities that later found fertile soil among the great French humanists like Montaigne.[17]

The concept of "vocation," as Ernst Troeltsch and Max Weber noted, is very different for Renaissance and Reformation thought.[18] For many Renaissance thinkers, attempts to bring humanistic knowledge and learning to bear on power and wealth, or to approach them with religious and moral prescriptions, were not seen as appropriate. By contrast, it was—as suggested by Calvin's *Institutes of the Christian Religion*—a part of the Christian vocation to bring religious and moral reflection to political and economic life. The Reformation thinkers held in suspicion an "aristocracy of culture," contemplative self-indulgence, and a learning not immediately directed to daily life in the world.

Given the historical diversity, then, it is risky to attempt an overall characterization of the ways in which the conception of the humanities developed during the early modern period. At the least it is

fair to say that it was complex, dynamic, and contrapuntal. In general, though, by the end of this period the main division and tension of emphasis between the public and the private vocation of the humanities was firmly established.

Individualism and Tradition

At the same time, the social thought that emerged after the Reformation in the West in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries broke sharply with older Western traditions. The conceptions of human action contained in its ideology became part of the common sense of the more developed Western societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The new philosophy saw individuals not primarily as members of a community, as had the older religions and political traditions, but as separate bits of matter in motion, each driven by will and passion, especially the fear of harm and the desire for comfort.[19] This new way of thinking was radically subversive of older conceptions of social order. In the new conception, society lacked any organic value. It was merely an association created by contracting individuals to further their own quite heterogeneous ends. This new philosophy is the classical form of liberalism, the ideology of economic man, what can be called utilitarian individualism.[20]

A reaction against the harshness and narrowness of utilitarian individualism set in quite early, already by the eighteenth century. This movement called, in its early phases, Romanticism might also be termed expressive individualism.[21] It accepted the individualistic assumptions of its predecessor but insisted on seeing something more in the individual heart than exclusive self-regard and the pursuit of self-interest. It recognized powerful emotions, feelings, and sentiments that created sympathy for nature and for other persons. It has accompanied utilitarian individualism, in a variety of forms, ever since, partly as critic, partly as complement. Particularly among the educated classes, utilitarian and expressive individualism have shunted aside older strands of the Western tradition—biblical religion and civic humanism in particular—though these latter have never ceased to carry some cultural influence. Science and technology (both present and future oriented) reinforce an antihistorical, antitradition bias.

The primary problem that the triumph of the individualistic ideologies raises for the humanities is our relationship to the past, to time and memory. All cultures outside the modern West have viewed the past—the source of sustaining tradition—as a primary cultural resource, probably *the* primary cultural resource. Modern individualist ideologies are almost by definition antitraditional, inimical to memory. It is not that modern culture, certainly modern academic culture, wishes to remain ignorant of the past. We now know more or can know more about the past than anyone has ever been able to know before. But our relation to the past is different from that of traditional cultures. Traditional cultures remember the past in order to incorporate it. We seem to remember the past in order to abolish it; and it is perhaps no accident that the most advanced frontier of this tendency is located in the United States.[22]

The ethos of utilitarian individualism has, of course, for a long time been seeping into the humanistic disciplines them-

selves, however much humanists may initially have resisted the new tendencies. The most obvious influence is the questioning of all received opinion. Thus, even in the case where tradition itself is the object of study, as a living reality it is often viewed with suspicion and skepticism. Every text, every event, is to be considered on its own terms, so far as the investigator can get at it with the most sophisticated possible critical methods. If a scholar can overturn received opinion and offer a "revised" view, he or she has scored a great triumph. A relentless historicizing, beginning as early as the Renaissance, while increasing our knowledge, has pushed the past ever further away from us.[23] In remembering too much, that tendency has come close to destroying any practical memory at all.

Expressive individualism has exploded the past in a somewhat different way. It too works with the ideal of what Michael J. Sandel has called an "unencumbered self,"[24] but here the encumbrances to be eliminated are not restraints on the pursuit of self-interest but limits on the expression of authentic feeling. The great modernist writers were trying to free themselves from every constraint of convention and routine, to discover the depths of true individuality. Given this recent history, it is not hard to see why the humanities are in crisis and have difficulty producing wisdom or character.

Professionalizing the Humanities

The third key phase in the development of the modern understanding of the humanities began toward the end of the nineteenth century and reached maturity during the first decades of the twentieth. This phase, the professionalization and institutionalization of the humanities, produced a clear differentiation of separate disciplines, each with its own special canons of rigor and methods of research and each firmly formalized in university curricula.[25] This professionalization tended to confine the humanities to an academic setting. Professional humanists then came to address their central activities of teaching and scholarly writing to other professionals and students in their field.

The rise of the applied humanities has begun to challenge and change this extreme, historically idiosyncratic situation. Of course viewed from the perspective of this most recent, atypical period, the concept of an "applied humanities" is an error. But when viewed in the light of the total tradition of the humanities in our civilization, it fits squarely within it—a return to the kind of diverse purposes and social roles that have characterized the humanities for most of their history. Yet by the same token, the applied humanities cannot offer a full expression of the humanities tradition either, because of the tradition's extreme diversity. They can, however, offer a way of keeping alive the energy, the tensions, and the creative ambiguities that have always marked that tradition. As a result of the long historical development summarized above, the applied humanities face a unique task. How can they cope with professionalization while at the same time not sacrificing the care and rigor it has often brought? For it is that professionalization, extending back for at least a half-century, that sundered much of the humanities from the larger social life outside of the university and that set the stage for the disciplinary nar-

rowness that marks much of their work at its highest levels.

A number of sociological and intellectual signs identify this professionalization in the post-World War I period.[26] Academic associations and specialized disciplinary journals gained in importance. Standards of merit based upon an evaluation of published work began to replace the nineteenth century's dependence on social status or inherited position as the measure of success for an academic career. During the same period, criteria were established for tenure. Certain universities emerged as leaders in the various humanistic disciplines, and methods of training and apprenticeship were developed in philosophy, history, and literature for training new scholars in these areas.[27] Thus a range of criteria ordinarily associated with a profession—specialization, distinct methods, criteria for apprenticeship and promotion—emerged within the humanities in the late 1920s and early 1930s. On top of that, scholars in the humanities began to see their task in part as that of developing methodologies for the examination of humanistic problems akin to those utilized in the sciences.

The humanities retained their place in the curriculum relative to the emerging social sciences by stressing the importance of liberal studies in the production of public-spirited, service-oriented, open-minded civic leaders. That theme served to strengthen more traditional rationales dating from civic humanism and the Emersonian tradition. The study of history, philosophy, the classics, and literature was touted as useful for the kinds of applied concerns that dominated the curriculum in other areas of the modern university. Once the humanities had reestablished their credibility within the modern university, they then held their territory by defending the utility of the pure pursuit of inquiry. It was precisely their nonutility, the timelessness of their concerns, that was praised and supported as useful. The social sciences and the humanities continued in tension during the early part of the twentieth century; and these trends have, to a great extent, continued up until the present day.

3. *Current Work in Applied Humanities*

No single term or concept adequately captures the various manifestations and aspirations of the humanities. While this report assumes a tacit distinction between the humanities in a contemporary disciplinary sense and applied humanities, there are no sharp boundaries, either conceptually or in practice. Nonetheless, work in applied humanities has some characteristic features—family resemblances more than identical likenesses—that serve to give a different flavor and emphasis to its work. In part the difference may be in the audience to be addressed: either the general public or professionals from fields other than the humanities. Arguments, language, and deployment of examples will be different from what would be the case in dialogue with disciplinary peers. In part the difference may be the choice of issues to be addressed—those that exercise the larger society rather than specialists in a technical field; or addressing issues in a concrete rather than theoretical way.[28]

In short, no single characterization is likely to capture some "essence" of applied humanities; and any generalization will admit of exceptions. The borderline becomes perhaps most indistinct when moving between or among different levels of humanistic application and interpretation. Understanding and interpretation are central to any sensible construal of the work of the humanities. But that work can be done at the most broad and encompassing level, e.g., attempting to comprehend the drive for meaning and values in human nature; or much more narrowly, e.g., attempting to interpret the possible range of meanings in a complex passage of poetry. A public policy issue—for example, gun control—can with equal legitimacy be approached as a debate symbolic of competing strains in the history of American culture, or as an issue of the relationship between law and morality. While the two approaches need by no means be exclusive, they would most likely be explored in different ways and by making use of different humanistic methods.

In what follows we present brief surveys of the kind of work being done in what we would characterize as an applied humanities mode (even if many who do such work might not exactly so describe their work). Perhaps it is not surprising, but an important discovery for many who took part in our project was how little we often knew about applied work in fields other than our own. It was a healthy reminder of the extent to which the humanities have remained isolated, not only from the broader society, but from each other as well. It also became evident from our explorations that most of the interest in applied humanities is to be found in the fields of philosophy and history, though with pockets of interest here and there in

literature, linguistics, and classics. We will limit our remarks here to the first three fields only.

Philosophy

Of all the humanities disciplines, philosophy has undoubtedly witnessed the most rapid and widespread development of applied studies. It has also thus witnessed a sharp shift in interest and focus, one that has revived a much older American tradition. During the nineteenth century, American philosophers routinely addressed their work as much to an educated public as to their fellow academics. Questions of practical morality, religion, culture, and politics were thought to be appropriate philosophical fare, and the course on moral philosophy was considered a central ingredient in undergraduate higher education.[29] By the 1930s, spurred in part by the rise of positivism and in part by the professionalization common to all of the humanistic fields, those earlier marks of the field fell by the wayside. Logic, epistemology, and the philosophy of language came to dominate the major university departments. As a background for understanding current work in applied philosophy, three factors important to its development need to be mentioned.

First, almost all the work that has been done thus far in applied philosophy has grown out of what may broadly be referred to as the British analytic tradition. That tradition has focused on the use of language, logical systems, and conceptual analysis. The predominance of the analytic approach in applied philosophy has given applied work a distinctive identity; and the contributions that applied philosophy can make grow largely out of the strengths of that approach. It is an open question whether the "continental" approach, principally phenomenology—with its stress on subjectivity, the structures of consciousness, and the "life worlds" within which consciousness is formed—will eventually produce its own variant of applied philosophy.[30] Through its contacts with sociology in "ethnomethodology," for example, phenomenological approaches have already provided some interesting insights on the dynamics of the professional-client relationship and the social construction of reality in clinical settings.[31] The revival of pragmatism (a more distinctly American phenomenon) now going on in some quarters may also serve to inject new philosophical orientations into applied philosophical studies.[32]

Second, the impetus for the development of applied philosophy grew out of major transformations within disciplinary philosophy that have occurred in the last decade or so. In the 1950s and 1960s academic philosophy was dominated by the philosophy of science and other highly technical areas of the philosophy of language and logic. It had almost self-consciously become a highly professional field, moving sharply away from social and political issues or guidance for individual lives.[33] Interest in social philosophy was at a low ebb, and ethics was almost exclusively concerned with the metaethical analysis of the meaning and justification of moral terms and arguments. The pendulum has shifted considerably in recent years as normative social philosophy and ethics have experienced an extraordinary intellectual renaissance.[34] The advent in 1970 of the influential journal, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, conveniently symbolizes the shift. Work in applied philosophy, which draws heavily on these newly revitalized

The term "applied philosophy" is an enigma. Some view it as a redundancy; others as a contradiction. Some as indicating an important change in the focus of philosophical investigation; others as what philosophers have always been concerned with. And some view it as a welcome revitalization of the discipline that has stagnated; others as the eclipse of the queen of the sciences. Such differing views are neither unusual nor surprising, but they do point to the need to subject the notion of applied philosophy to careful scrutiny.

. . . The latter third of the 20th century is seeing a significant change in the Anglo-American philosopher's conception of his task. It began with the "rediscovery" of normative ethics. In their teaching and research philosophers started attending to the questions of personal morality that everyone faced in their daily lives. The extension of this focus into issues of social importance was given a tremendous lift by the publication of John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*. And today sees philosophers both studying and teaching courses on business ethics, medical ethics, environmental ethics and the like. Moreover, this activity is no longer limited to the narrow confines of the academy. Philosophers are actively attempting to influence public policy on these issues by setting up "think tanks" to research and debate them, testifying before policy-making bodies, and offering themselves as consultants to professionals in a wide variety of areas.

On this understanding, then, applied philosophy involves focusing philosophical analysis and deliberation on issues of societal and individual import. Moreover, it insists upon addressing these issues in the context in which they arise, rather than constantly abstracting from real situations to ideal cases. In other words, rather than treating the facts of situation as variables that can be altered at will . . . applied philosophy insists upon beginning with the facts and sticking to them. . . .

Louis I. Katzner

branches of the discipline, now enjoys the kind of intellectual support from the discipline that did not exist in the fifties and sixties. Indeed, the rapport between disciplinary and applied studies in philosophy is closer than in any other field and provides an interesting contrast to the barriers existing between academic and public history.

Third, the subject matter and problem settings with which applied philosophy has dealt are more diverse and wide-ranging than those to which other fields in the humanities have been applied. Work in applied philosophy has ranged virtually across the entire spectrum of activities in our society, from the most global questions of environmental and biomedical ethics, warfare, and governmental foreign policy, through decision-making in business and professional practice settings, to the most personal and intimate issues of sexual morality and intrafamilial relationships.[35]

The current applications of philosophical inquiry are therefore exceedingly difficult to catalogue and classify. However, one distinction will help to sort out the two basic types of study done by applied philosophers. This is the distinction between *clinical decisionmaking*, or micro-decisionmaking, and *policy decisionmaking*, or macrodecisionmaking.

Purposive, rational human choice, or more simply, "decisionmaking" is a basic unit of applied philosophical inquiry. Philosophers working in an applied vein examine the reasons and justifications for human choices, and they bring ethical principles and other normative criteria to bear in the evaluation of the moral roots and consequences of specific decisions. They aim to clarify the reasoning behind decisionmaking, to explore neglected assumptions, alternatives, and options, and to assist in a process of just-

ly assigning responsibility for choices that lead to human harm. This characterization fits applied ethics most directly, of course, but it also pertains to the application of other branches of philosophy. Logic and epistemology, for example, are also crucially involved in the assessment of the reasoning that goes into decisionmaking.[36]

The distinction between clinical and policy decisionmaking is useful because it identifies two types of choice situations that can in principle (and often do in practice) call for somewhat different standards of reasoning and criteria of evaluation. Moreover, it cuts across the two realms where most work in applied philosophy is done, professional ethics and public policy analysis.

Clinical decisions are typically limited in their scope, in the duration of their effect, and in the number of persons whose lives they affect. Most often they encompass face-to-face relationships. The limited character of these decisions, however, does not make them unimportant or inconsequential. They are often decisions about life and death, freedom or imprisonment, financial well-being or deprivation. Paradigmatic examples include the treatment decisions that physicians make for their patients, or the ways in which attorneys fashion a legal defense for their clients. Policy decisions, by contrast, set rules, standards, and administrative procedures that are relatively impersonal, affect an indeterminate number of people, regulate large domains of human activity, and often remain in effect for long periods of time. They can bear on housing, foreign policy, or welfare issues, and on the allocation of scarce resources, for example. They too have serious consequences, although the long-term implications are often difficult to identify precisely and may not be immediately obvious. Policy decisions are made in both the public and the private sectors.

One of the most difficult tasks facing applied philosophy is to clarify the ingredients of rational, responsible decisionmaking in the realms of clinical and policy decisionmaking. Most work in professional ethics to date has concentrated on the issues involved in clinical decisions, while applied philosophical studies of public policy and business ethics (which grow out of political and social philosophy as well as ethics) have tended to focus on policy decisions. Increasingly, however, these two areas are beginning to merge, as it becomes clear that in our complex, technological society policy decisions shape clinical decisions and vice versa.[37]

Yet as important as is the interest in clinical and policy decisionmaking, it is no more important than a focus on key conceptual and theoretical questions that have a powerful impact of policy thinking and attitudes. The concepts of "rights," "health," "responsibility," and "autonomy" have a central role in policy, just as do questions such as "when does 'life' begin?" Conceptual analysis does not necessarily focus directly on decisions; but it is no less vital for policy thought and action.

On the whole, relationships between disciplinary and applied philosophers tend to be cordial and mutually respectful. Practitioners of applied philosophy generally believe that their analyses should conform to the same standards of rigor and argumentation that prevail in the mainstream discipline, even though they often must adopt different conventions of writing style and presentation. And, of course, many individual philosophers move back and forth between applied and nonapplied work.

Yet there is at prese[illegible] a lively debate among philosophers concerning the intellectual status of applied philosophy. Many participants in this debate—on both sides—believe that applied work is merely derivative and parasitic.[38] They cast applied philosophers in the role of mediators, brokers, or translators whose task is to transmit disciplinary knowledge to lay audiences or to apply general principles of theories to specific cases.[39] Others, however, are not so sanguine about the self-sufficiency and power of disciplinary knowledge. They argue that the abstract conceptual analyses and normative theories produced by the discipline often distort the human reality of the issues with which they deal.[40] They contend that the experience and insight accumulated by applied philosophical studies can and should creatively feed back into the discipline to improve the "basic" philosophical research that goes on there.[41]

This debate is healthy and productive. The overall legitimacy of applied philosophy is firmly if not fully established, and those who engage in applied studies should be encouraged to improve the quality and expand the scope of applied work. At the same time, disciplinary studies can be—and are being—enhanced by the philosophically creative work being done in the applied wing of the discipline. The debate over applied philosophy has now ceased to be a squabble over turf and has turned into a lively dialogue about the more fundamental issue of improving the quality of the work being done.

Applied and Public History

Applied work in history is somewhat more complicated than in other fields because it is made up of different intersecting components.[42] Many academic or disciplinary historians, beginning to reassert the broad public and contemporary relevance of their work, argue (as did Thucydides) that an accurate understanding of the past is essential to making decisions in the present. The nonacademic wing of the profession—those calling themselves public historians who work outside the university and engage in a wide variety of historical projects relatively unconnected to disciplinary research—has become much more organized, self-conscious, and active in recent years. Public history has become a vital sector of the history discipline, and its own self-definition and sense of mission greatly extends and complicates the range of possible meanings that application can have in the field of history.

In tandem with those developments, a subfield is beginning to emerge that concerns itself directly with the problems of policy analysis and policymaking in both the government and the corporate sector. Peter Stearns has suggested that we distinguish this third area of inquiry by labeling it "applied history."[43] Because applied historians often do their work outside of traditional academic settings and address nonstudent and lay audiences, they are akin to public historians. But since their work is focused specifically on policy analysis, they form a distinct category and have an orientation and agenda different from either academic historians or other public historians not directly concerned with policy issues.

That complicated situation forces the making of some cumbersome distinctions, and even among historians themselves, there is as yet little agreement on basic terminology. For convenience, therefore, we will mention both "the application of history" and "applied history." The former encompasses all of the components of the field mentioned above; the latter is pertinent when historians take part directly in policy analysis and the policymaking process. Recalling the distinction between clinical decisionmaking and policy decisionmaking introduced in the preceding section, we should mention that as yet no branch of history has been applied to clinical decisionmaking. Almost all of the applied energies in this field have been directed toward policy questions.

Academic or disciplinary history has begun to reassert its connection with public life in a number of ways. Traditionally, of course, it has always claimed public relevance as a core component of a liberal education. However, the growth of social history as a field of research and the increasingly close connection between historical and social scientific research have produced academic studies of clear policy relevance. This shift in the basic agenda of the discipline has also produced a new generation of historians equipped to participate in the curricula of schools of public policy and public administration. As a result of this educational cross-fertilization, more explicit attention has been paid to the contribution that historical training can make to the general and professional education of policy analysts and policymakers.[44] These contributions include the development of careful research habits, instilling a sensitivity to the processes of change, and developing a capacity to recognize the external factors that produce a social moment when policy innovation will likely succeed or likely fail. In a more general way, academic research can have an impact on policymaking by correcting the mistaken assumptions about the past that policymakers hold.

Public history is a broad and diverse wing of the profession. Public historians often have specialized professional training in media, museum work, and the like. In general, public history makes use of history outside the academic context. It includes, for instance, the entertainment and enlightenment of public audiences through museums and historical site preservation efforts, media presentations, and the development of regional or other types of memorial histories that contribute to the special regional, cultural, and ethnic identities of particular groups. In many cases these activities of public history have policy implications. They may help to sensitize political leaders to the existence of unmet social needs, or they may assist in the consolidation of grass-roots movements. In general, however, public history is not primarily oriented toward specific policy issues or the task of policy analysis. Like academic history, albeit in different ways, public history is primarily devoted to an educational and public service mission.[45]

Applied history proper has complex ties with both academic and public history. Like the former, it is based on scholarly investigation and research; like the latter, it involves work outside the university and interaction with nonhistorians. Nonetheless, because of its focused orientation toward policy analysis, applied history has its own distinctive purposes and problems. It aims to make two principal contributions to policymaking in both governmental and corporate settings. First, it provides a usable

institutional memory for corporations, agencies, and other complex institutions.[46] In this way, it enriches the temporal horizon and context of institutional decisionmaking and helps to preserve the distinctive traditions of the organization. Yet, too often in the past, applied historians playing this role have been employed to produce honorific documents useful mainly for public relations purposes. One important challenge facing applied historians today is to move beyond this memorialist function and to produce critical analyses of institutional history that can seriously inform policymaking; and some have begun to do so.[47]

Second, applied history also often aims to employ historical data and analysis in order to improve the definition of policy problems, to aid in the assessment of policy options, and to recommend the best available policy choices.[48] In pursuing these goals, applied historians join

Applying the Classics at the Naval War College

Lecturing to U. S. Navy captains on Thucydides, analyzing ancient Spartan battle plans with Marine Corps colonels, and debating the ethical limits on U. S. military responses to terrorist attacks are all part of a normal day's work for ALVIN H. BERNSTEIN, a classicist on the faculty of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.

After majoring in classics as an undergraduate at Cornell University, Dr. Bernstein spent a year at Oxford and then returned to Cornell where he received his doctorate in Ancient History in 1968. For the next fourteen years he taught in the history department at Cornell University, specializing in ancient military history and Near Eastern civilization. A lecture invitation first brought him to the Naval War College in 1980, and he returned there to spend the following year as a Distinguished Visiting Professor. Attracted by the unusual challenge of teaching the humanities to a student body comprised of high ranking military officers and civilian policy makers, he joined the War College faculty as a full-time member of the Strategy and Policy Department in 1982.

The combination of his conventional academic career at Cornell and his experience teaching at the War College has given Dr. Bernstein a special opportunity to reflect on the differences between "pure" humanistic scholarship and the role of the "applied humanist" in what is very definitely not an ivory tower setting.

The most obvious difference, in his view, is in the types of students he has to teach. Like its sister institutions, the Army War College and the Air Defense University, the Naval War College stands near the top of the military's internal education and career development system. Its student body is made up of senior military officers—Navy captains and Marine, Army, and Air Force colonels—and mid-career civilian executives from the Department of Defense, the CIA, and other federal agencies. These officers and officials are well seasoned, pragmatically oriented professionals, more accustomed to commanding ships at sea or battalions

applied philosophers, applied social scientists, and others in the domain of policy analysis. Their special purpose is to contribute the distinctive perspectives and concepts that come from historical inquiry.

Should applied history become a separate, autonomous discipline with its own training programs and its own standards of practice? A debate on that question has emerged, but we hope that such a separation will be restrained and limited. The health of both the academic and the applied wing of history—as in the other humanistic fields—requires that intellectual channels remain open. Applied historians should not, and need not, weaken disciplinary standards of rigor in their research; that would run the danger of compromising their critical contributions to the improvement of policy analysis. Peer review mechanisms—not yet as common as they should be—are essential to monitor the quality of work on

in the field than they are to sitting in the classroom pondering the texts of Plato and Thucydides.

At first glance, this might seem an inauspicious environment for a classicist and an unlikely setting for a humanities education. Dr. Bernstein has found quite the opposite to be the case, however. As mature adults and experienced professionals, his students are far more serious about their studies than normal undergraduates or even graduate students. In teaching the latter, Dr. Bernstein often found that he had to convince them of the value of studying the classics; for them the humanities often seemed to deal with abstract and etherial concerns. But he rarely has to coax his War College students to take the classics seriously; most often he finds that the perennial human issues raised by these texts speak directly and tangibly to the life experiences of military commanders.

When discussing a work like *The History of the Peleponnesian War*, for example, Dr. Bernstein aims to familiarize his students with the mind and the sensibility that informs the text, and to study the nature—and fallibility—of human judgments that shape political and military decision making. This capacity to reflect on the process of judgment is then applied to concrete problems of military strategy and planning. This pedagogical approach is consonant with the Naval War College's traditional humanistic approach to military strategy, which is treated as an "art" rather than a "science."

More than anything else, it is probably this basic institutional philosophy that enables Dr. Bernstein to function effectively as an applied classicist at the Naval War College. After two years he has no regrets about his decision to move into that setting. He finds his teaching rewarding, and he has been able to pursue the course of his own scholarly research without difficulty. Above all, he still identifies himself as a classicist and believes that he is making an important contribution by bringing the conceptual framework of a trained ancient historian to bear on the contemporary issues discussed at the Naval War College. "My experiences at the War College," he says, "have reinforced my belief in the value of looking at the world through the humanist's eyes, and in particular through the classicist's eyes."

Tending to the History of the United States Senate

Few institutions in American society are more conscious of, or take more pride in, their own special history and traditions than the United States Senate. But for all its august sense of history, the Senate has a highly fragmented institutional memory and very few mechanisms that ensure long term continuity in its functioning. With a fairly high turnover rate among its professional staff, a Senate committee may well begin investigating a given issue without realizing that virtually the same issue was studied (perhaps by the same committee) fifteen, ten, or even five years before. Repairing the tatters in that institutional memory and helping to make the Senate's past better inform its present are just two of the tasks that fall to the Senate's Historian, RICHARD ALLAN BAKER.

In the early 1970s then Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, began the process of improving the preservation and use of the Senate's extensive archives. One outcome of that effort was the creation in 1975 of the Senate Historical office. In that year Baker, who several years before had served briefly as acting curator of the Senate's art collection, became the Director of the Historical office.

Coming out of graduate school in the mid-60s Baker had begun a conventional academic career. A specialist in American history, he had taught at a small college briefly while working on his dissertation. In 1967, however, he decided to leave teaching and took a masters degree in library science at Columbia University. Moving to Washington, he worked at the Library of Congress, and then spent several years with a private research firm until he assumed his present position with the Senate.

As Director of the Historical Office, Baker supervises a staff of six full-time and two part-time professional historians. The Historical Office takes on a variety

client-oriented projects. At the same time, the experience and findings of applied historical work can feed back into the discipline and improve the quality of its basic research and theory.[49]

The demands of working in policy settings will, however, require applied historians to accommodate their styles of investigation in certain ways. Like other applied researchers, they must learn to cope with time pressures and the need to do "quick and dirty" research.[50] They may also have to rely less heavily than the disciplinary historians on the narrative mode of presentation, highlighting instead the analytic conclusions and generalizations of their studies. They must on occasion be prepared to make specific policy recommendations. They will be less able than their academic colleagues to adopt the traditional tone of the detached observer or storyteller.

Literature

Applied work in literary study has, until now, been less vigorously and widely pursued than analogous work in

of tasks. One of its most important functions at the moment is to prepare for the celebration of the Senate's bicentennial in 1989. In addition, the staff undertakes a variety of archival and research functions, including writing a popular history of the Senate that will eventually be published as a textbook, editing transcripts of historically significant executive sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee so that these important documents can be more readily available to scholars, and providing background historical research for the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel.

Baker sees his role as an historian employed by the Senate as a special example of the possibilities for applying the humanities in a governmental setting. He does not provide historical research directly related to pending legislation (that, insofar as it is done at all, is handled by committee staff members and the Congressional Research Service). However, he does serve as a bridge between the Senate as an institution and the academic community. One of his main goals is to make the Senate records and archives—a huge and largely untapped historical resource—more useful and accessible to scholars. In that way he hopes to foster better historical studies of the Senate and hence a better understanding of the Senate's role in the American political process.

Baker and his staff remain active scholars and historians in their own right, working (mainly at night and on weekends) on their own projects. They are active in professional groups such as the Organization of American Historians and the American Historical Association.

Reflecting on what he hopes to accomplish in the future, Baker observes: "There is a tremendous need for a better historical understanding of the U. S. Congress. There is also a deep well of interest in history among Congressmen and their staff, but in the past that interest has not been consistently articulated. The creation and development of Historical Offices in the Senate and the House are helping us place the activities of Congress in a better historical perspective."

philosophy and in history.[51] To a large extent this situation results from the relatively recent internal development of the professional study of literature. In an earlier generation, critics such as F. R. Leavis in England and Edmund Wilson and, later, Lionel Trilling in the United States made ethical and social commentary an integral part of the study of literary texts. However, in the fifties and early sixties the New Criticism—a movement distinguished by its emphasis on the literary text as an integral work of art demanding careful attention to the aesthetic dimensions of its language—tended to shift academic criticism away from this broader engagement with social, psychological, and political issues. While many of the founders of the New Criticism were deeply motivated by theological and cultural concerns, over time the movement did develop a somewhat narrow scholastic orientation.[52]

At this same time, and in connection with the ascendency of the New Criticism, doctrines of the purity of the aesthetic attitude and of aesthetic distance from practical interest (ideas that have a long and varied history) took on new life. This situation still prevails in much

of the academy today. More recent critical fashions, for example, deconstruction, have overturned many of the tenets and practices of the New Criticism; but they have not necessarily returned criticism to a serious engagement with practical matters. The deconstructionist idea of "free play" and the deconstructionistic critic's mistrust of any appearance of order or system can lead away from serious, engaged ethical criticism.

There are, to be sure, some who would argue that deconstruction has important practical implications—as must any serious approach to interpretation.[53] Yet the prevalent idea that criticism is a kind of creative fictionmaking has appeared to many critics to license a kind of playful and clever writing that dissociates itself from the serious ethical concerns even of texts that have always been understood to express such concerns. And the arcane and self-referential style of much of this criticism does not readily lend itself to the sort of social dialogue that people working in applied humanities would like to generate.

It is possible, nonetheless, to point to several developments in current literary study that work against this pervasive fashion, promising a more fruitful connection between the study of literature and the understanding of practical problems.

1. *The use of literary texts in applied ethics.* Courses in applied ethics at many different levels (from the undergraduate introductory course to specialized courses within professional schools) have frequently included literary texts among their readings. Sometimes the motivations for this have been simply pedagogical: the instructor chooses these works for their power to present the ethical issues in an engaging and moving way. Sometimes the instructor also has theoretical reasons for the choice. Literary texts, for example, can make a distinctive contribution to a study of the issues that could not be made by philosophical works, just in virtue of their literary style and structure. They immerse themselves in the complex stories of human lives and evoke an activity of emotion and imagination not often cultivated by conventional philosophical texts.

2. *The relationship between literature and philosophy.* Closely connected with that enterprise is a growing interest in investigating the boundaries between philosophy and literature, especially on the part of philosophers. The issue is frequently raised concerning the treatment of moral issues; and its resolution is clearly of importance for the teaching and practice of applied ethics. Philosophers such as Stanley Cavell and Hilary Putnam have been raising questions about the knowledge of human life that we get from works of literature. Is it the same as the knowledge offered by philosophical works, or different in kind? Philosophers who began their work on literature by discussing the presence within literary works of certain familiar philosophical questions and arguments are now, increasingly, turning their attention to the closeness of the connection between style and content, asking whether there is a kind of insight that literature can give us precisely in virtue of its stylistic differences from philosophy.

This work—which has led to a more subtle and proper literary reading by philosophers of the literary texts in question—is now beginning to be of serious interest to literary critics as well. Increasing numbers of interdisciplinary symposia and journals are appearing as the two

An English Professor's Business

KATHRYN HUNTER was "minding my own business, an English professor's business," at a small liberal arts college when the decision was made by the college to begin a medical school. Among the courses she had taught was a freshman honors course called "The Evolution of the Ideas of Evolution," which biology students headed for medical school often took. That course led her to become acquainted with the science faculty, which resulted in her appointment to the health careers advisory committee, and, as the plans for the medical school heated up, ultimately, the chairmanship of the task force on relating the social sciences and the humanities with the medical school curriculum. "Because this was Morehouse College, we were particularly concerned with reinforcing medical students' commitment to underserved people, and a brief look at the American medical curriculum suggested that a dehumanizing education would influence the sort of practitioner that emerged from our program."

Edmund Pellegrino, M.D., then at Yale, visited several times on an NEH consultant's grant and persuaded her of the potential utility of literature in a medical curriculum. In the spring of 1977 she applied for and received an Institute for Human Values in Medicine grant to develop two year-long courses drawing upon literature, philosophy, history, anthropology, religious studies, and law. A few years later she accepted a position teaching literature at the medical school of the University of Rochester.

"From a mainstream English department point of view, teaching literature in a medical school is distinctly odd. But another view, mine, is that this job tests the value of liberal education. I teach the human condition. If the humanities have a life-long value, one that makes them worth studying and teaching to those who will not be humanities scholars, then it is here, as part of medical education, that they may be most useful."

She believes that her view of literature has been modified by teaching literature in a medical school setting. "I no longer read only "English." I am interested these days in absences, fiction and poetry that have *not* been written—about nurses who are ordinary but admirable women, for example, or about people living with genetic defects. Why these situations fail to engage the creative imagination suggests as much abouf our society as the stories and themes that can be found in literature. Above all, I am fascinated by looking at medicine, its characters and themes and stories, with an eye trained in literature and in literary criticism."

Among her failures she cites not yet finding support for more medical-humanities faculty at Rochester, not arguing well enough for the uses of literature earlier, and all those encounters where "I didn't understand Them and They didn't understand me."

On the other hand she ranks among her successes as an "applied humanist" contributions to the medical curriculum both at Rochester and at Morehouse, her informal teaching and learning opportunities with house staff, and, especially, her own enlarged intellectual life.

professions begin to acknowledge that each has something to learn from the other; and especially in the areas of ethical and social value most pertinent to applied humanities work. This trend will have important implications for the way in which both disciplines go about applying themselves to practical questions.

3. *Literary theory and social thought and practice.* Another recent development has been an increasing interest on the part of social and legal thinkers in communicating with literary theorists, in order to make progress on some important questions of method and procedure.[54] The complex controversies in recent literary theory concerning validity in interpretation, and the proper norm for interpretative practice, have been closely studied by legal theorists and lawyers. Their aim is to improve the theory and the practice of legal interpretation. The two professions have also discussed, with mutual profit, the idea of social convention in interpretation. A pioneering group in generating this discussion has been the Yale Legal Theory Workshop, led by Owen Fiss, which regularly invites literary theorists (as well as philosophers and social scientists) to speak with practicing lawyers. The legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin, for example, has recently argued that distinctions and arguments from literary theory can be used to support his view of constitutional and legal interpretation against its rivals—hence, to defend certain judicial decisions over others.[55]

Whatever the merits of this particular argument, there can be no doubt that the theoretical discussion of crucial legal issues has been rendered more subtle and more rigorous by the contact with literary theory (and the related areas of philosophy). And literary theory has been enriched and invigorated by this contact with important practical questions.

4. *Socially and politically engaged styles of literary interpretation.* Finally, there has always been a continous tradition of literary interpretation and teaching that has not been influenced by the New Criticism and its descendants, but has remained close to the social commitments characteristic of the ancient Greek study of literature. Prominent examples of this kind of criticism have been linked with distinctive political doctrines, especially to Marxism and existentialism. Each of these movements has thought it appropriate to ask of a work of literature how it influences the political lives of those who read it, or how it was influenced by the class background of the author. Each insists upon assessing and criticizing texts in the light of their practical contribution. Each movement has produced both criticism of the works of others and works of literature of its own, which exemplify its commitments. Although it would be relatively uncommon to find in the contemporary academy a self-confessed Marxist or existentialist literary critic, still the influence of both of these movements on the undergraduate teaching of literature and on the popular response to literature has been enormous, especially through the prestige of figures such as Brecht, Sartre, and Camus.

A major recent development has been the growth, in this country and in Europe, of a feminist criticism of literature, determined to examine literary works for information concerning women's lives and aspirations, the perception of them by others, and of their own self-perceptions. This criticism has insisted on maintaining (even in the face of skep-

ticism from the professions) a vigorous connection between the analysis of texts and a confrontation with current social issues. Some of this criticism has affiliations with Marxism and some with varieties of psychoanalytic theory. Some of it is radical and/or utopian, while some is concerned more with the improvement of sensibilities than with sweeping political change. A common concern running throughout, however, has been to identify and to reform stereotypes of women that are perpetuated in myths, fairy tales, and even in linguistic usage itself.

In that way also this form of criticism aspires to transform in some fundamental ways the growing child's perceptions of gender difference. There is tremendous variety and vigor in this movement. It is one of the areas of humanities work that is most directly changing daily life in this country. As children are receiving a different, more carefully scrutinized first literary education, and as we are being urged to ask questions about our earliest and deepest myths, stories, and fantasies, we are seeing how immediate and how practically influential literary study can be.

In a parallel development, members of minority, racial, and ethnic groups are also subjecting the literary texts of the culture to critical scrutiny. They are demanding texts and courses that portray with sensitivity the variety and richness of the experience of their group. This social questioning has influenced the practice of authors (and filmmakers) by making once-common stereotypes unacceptable; and it has also had a significant effect upon the ways in which literature (and film) are talked about and taught.

4. *Models of Application*

As even a cursory survey of current work in applied humanities makes clear, there are numerous ways in which the humanities can be deployed. But are some ways more legitimate than others? One of the less valid attractions of an "applied" humanities is the implicit suggestion that they possess a body of knowledge that can—by translation, deduction, or transmutation—be superimposed directly onto social issues. Can the proper care of dying patients be immediately extrapolated from a reading of Tolstoy's *The Death of Ivan Ilyich*; or Central American policy deduced from an analysis of Thucydides; or child abuse laws from Mill's *On Liberty*? That is not likely. A deductivist notion of the relationship between the humanities and policy turns out to be highly ambiguous and, perhaps, seriously misleading.

Yet, if taken in the proper way, the relationship between science and engineering may present at least a partial analogue for the humanities. This analogy will be misunderstood if one assumes that engineering draws in a simple way upon the theories of basic science in order to build bridges, roads, and dams. The truth of the matter, as Edwin T. Layton, Jr., has pointed out, is that the relationship between basic science and engineering application is not that of simple deduction at all. He notes that "the theory provided by classical physics is neither adequate nor sufficiently accurate, and engineers have had to develop their own body of theory."[56] Moreover, the engineering sciences that were "evolved to bridge the gap between theory and practice cannot, in general, be employed by a more or less mechanical deduction from theory. Instead, the approach tends to be empirical and inductive rather than deductive and theoretical." The concept of "engineering design" is the most fundamental part of engineering work and cannot be reduced to a simple deduction from theory. It requires creativity, the use of scientific theories designed for engineering purposes exclusively, and a willingness to put aside idealized models of the way nature works in order to embrace the actual physical constraints of the real world.

Similarly, as many of those in the applied humanities have come to realize, they are able often enough to draw upon accepted theoretical principles, but just as often are forced to modify or abandon them altogether in the face of the particular social or policy issues being addressed. If they persist in rigidly trying to make use of principles not devised for practical application, they may deform them in the process, and may also say little of value about the policy issue in question.

The experience of the social sciences in trying to adapt their methodologies and findings to policy research is instructive (and perhaps a cautionary tale) for those

attempting something similar within the humanities.[57] Beginning shortly before the Second World War, a concerted effort was made in the social sciences to bring them to bear on pressing national issues. That process was accelerated during the war and then blossomed considerably during the fifties and sixties. The attempt, however, to find the right fit between the social sciences and policy issues has been troubling and controversial. Considerable disagreement about the nature and validity of social science knowledge has been a fundamental stumbling block. The notion of "application" has been no less problematic. Efforts to simply deduce practical policy implications from large-scale social science theories have not been notably successful, even from the viewpoint of the most hopeful social scientists. From the side of those interested in making use of the knowledge, the efforts have not been that much more successful.

The sociologist James S. Coleman, in commenting upon the relationship between social science knowledge and policy problems, has written: ". . . A great amount of 'applied research' is funded which is neither discipline research nor very relevant to policy problems. . . . It is often a curious misapplication of the paraphernalia of discipline research outside the discipline: using excessively the jargon of the discipline; clutching tightly on to the most prestigious theories and theorists in the discipline . . . attempting to 'contribute to theory' (a theory which itself might be wrong, but is fashionable in the discipline), rather than address the problems in the real world; and other activities equally valueless except in their intended aim of increasing their author's standing in the discipline."[58] The same could undoubtedly be said for some recent work in the applied humanities.

One result of the various disputes has been the emergence of a number of different "models" of application in the social sciences. They provide a variety of suggestive possibilities for the humanities. Robert Mayer has nicely summarized four different models of the social science-policymaking relationship.[59]

One of the models is that of the *"social engineer"*: "This model involves the social scientist working with the decisionmaker in the direct application of existing theoretical knowledge to produce answers to policy questions. The engineer works on whatever problems are assigned or defined by the policymaker, leaving the selection of goals and objectives outside the utilization process. . . . In its most extreme form, the social engineer becomes a 'hand-maiden' or mandarin of the decisionmaker . . ."

The closest analogue to this model within the humanities might be that notion of applied ethics which sees its task as the straight-out application of prominent moral theories, drawn, say, from Kant, Mill, or John Rawls, to the moral dilemmas of policy or professional life.[60] There are a number of problems with this model in the humanities (as there are also in the social sciences). In its more debased form, it would not even try to make judgments about the validity of the theories; it would simply say, "if one is a utilitarian, then *X* would be the proper conclusion"; or, "if one is a deontologist, then *Y* would be the proper conclusion." That would lead to a type of "value-free" ethics, one likely to represent neither good ethics nor real neutrality. Equally hazardous would be the taking as a given the goals set by those outside of the humanities, as if there could be a sharp separation of ends and means. But such a separation would be a funda-

The Humanities and State Legislatures

"I was a guest at the legislative scene; and though a guest would normally try to keep his best foot forward, I also had a job to do, a finite tenure, and had less than the normal bureaucratic self-interest at stake. I could be a kind of hit-and-run participant. Under these circumstances I think I was probably too well behaved, but I do not know that this opinion is widely shared."

This is how RONALD JAGER looks back on his two-year experience as a Humanities Consultant on the staff of the New Hampshire state legislature. From 1980 to 1982 Jager took part in a multi-state project sponsored by the State Legislative Leaders Foundation, an organization devoted to upgrading the institutional functioning of the fifty state legislatures, and funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities. This project supported a small pilot group of humanities scholars who served on the staffs of "sunset committees" in several state legislatures. Sunset laws call for a thorough evaluation of the mandate, effectiveness, and underlying mission of state agencies, boards, and commissions at regular intervals. The project organizers believed that these sunset evaluations were a facet of the state legislative process where professional humanists could make a particularly direct and valuable contribution. In addition to Jager, a philosopher who worked in New Hampshire, other members of the pilot group were: Toby Moore, a literary critic who worked in the Connecticut state legislature; Rob Watts, a specialist in religious studies who worked in the Georgia state legislature; and Jane Raible, a theologian who worked in the Washington state legislature.

Like the other participants in the project, Jager had pursued a traditional academic career, and self-consciously approached his activities in the state legislature as an extension and application of his professional humanities background. A Harvard Ph.D., he taught in the philosophy department at Yale from 1965-1977 and published widely in the areas of analytic philosophy and logic. He began to move in the direction of applied studies in the late 1970s when he left Yale to take up full time residence in New Hampshire, where he became a free lance writer and consultant and collaborated with his wife in writing books on the history of two New Hampshire towns. At the same time he continued his teaching as a visiting professor at the University of New Hampshire.

Jager was able to extend his activities as a Humanities Consultant in the state legislature somewhat more broadly than were the other project participants. He organized a series of seminars for legislators and staff members in which invited

speakers would address particular public policy issues pertinent to the agenda of the legislative session then in progress. These seminars—which included such topics as the nuclear freeze, criminal justice policy, health care, and home rule—were broadcast on New Hampshire public television and gave legislators an opportunity to reflect on the broader historical and philosophical aspects of these issues. Like the evaluation reports prepared by the Sunset Office, which not only assessed the short term performance of various agencies but also analyzed their historical evolution, philosophical rationale, and institutional development, these policy seminars concretely demonstrated the contribution that scholarly humanistic perspectives could make to the legislative process.

Jager was also responsible for preparing several studies of the underlying values served by professional licensing and occupational certification procedures in the state. One such study focused on reforming the teacher certification requirements of the state's Department of Education.

By moving out of the Sunset Office and assuming these broader responsibilities, Jager found that he was able to loosen some of the constraints that the peculiar norms and customs of the state legislative environment placed on his activities as an applied humanist. Traditionally, in many state legislatures the functions of legislative staff members are quite limited. Staff members are expected to provide factual information to support legislative decision making, but they are not expected or encouraged to offer evaluations, advocacy, or political advice. Lobbyists and other associates of legislators provide that kind of input; staff members do not. Thus, not only Jager in New Hampshire but also the project participants in other states, all found that it was difficult to combine the role of staff member and Humanities Consultant. Policy analysis and procedural recommendations based on humanistic perspectives were not readily seen by legislators as simply informational contributions; applied humanistic analysis that had any bite to it spilled over into the realm of evaluation and advocacy and easily violated the norms of the staff role.

This situation hampered the effectiveness of all the project participants to some extent, and it illustrates a peculiar obstacle to applying the humanities in a state legislative setting. By moving out of the Sunset Office, Jager came to be seen more as a free floating consultant and less as an ordinary staff person. This helped lessen the role tension he experienced, and he found that by having a more ambiguous institutional identity he was able to function more effectively as an applied humanist. At least in the New Hampshire state legislature applying the humanities seemed to work best on a "hit and run" basis. Whether the humanities can have a lasting impact under those conditions, however, is open to question.

mental betrayal of the humanities. They cannot be a "handmaiden" to power without self-corruption.

Another possibility is the *"clinical model,"* first proposed by the late Alvin Gouldner: "In this model the social scientist interacts with the decisionmaker in all phases of the decisionmaking process. He assists in the clarification of goals and objectives, as well as in proposing appropriate programs and in evaluating them."[61] The analogue that comes to mind in the humanities would be that of philosopher-in-residence programs in hospitals, legislatures, or government agencies. This is a far more benign model of interaction, one that leaves the humanist as well as the policy analyst or decisionmaker with a full and free range of thought and action. To be successful, however, it requires a close and friendly relationship, with considerable give and take on each side.[62]

Still another alternative has come to be called the *"enlightenment model"*: it "is one in which the social scientist develops a series of broad scale studies of complex social systems. . . . These studies result in bodies of data and new modes by which society can evaluate its present goals and objectives and develop new ones. The impact of the social sciences is indirect rather than direct. While working on the same issues being dealt with by the policymaker, but independently of the latter, social scientists have a good deal of freedom to define problems and pursue inquiries on their own initiative." The humanities parallel suggested here is that of the scholar who chooses for his or her work some current policy issues, but whose study is conducted independently of a working relationship with policymakers or of observing the policy process at firsthand.

Still another possibility is what Robert Mayer calls the *"nonparticipation model"*: Here it would be "argued that social scientists should continue to write and do research as independent academicians. To the extent that their results are useful, they will be picked up in the policymaking process." This category can helpfully be amended by suggesting that the nonparticipation model would really encompass the work of those who have no special interest in policy issues at all. They would have no objection to a policymaker picking up their work, but would not seek it and would strenously object if even a comma were changed. Their work would have to be taken pure or not at all. The humanities analogue

> Professionals in the health field allegedly have moral obligations to their patients which override normal moral rules, especially moral obligations to treat the claims of persons equally. . . . "When should one's obligation to a client override one's obligation to society?" is not a question that can be answered by considering moral theory for an automatic answer. . . . Philosophers who make such professions their point of analysis in ethics cannot simply apply theory from the outside. To attempt to straightforwardly apply theory in this way would be an exercise in casuistry, and applied ethics is not casuistry. Rather, philosophers working in applied ethics need to begin from the perspective of the profession and engage in a constant interaction with theory and practice. As a result of that interaction, the theory will change. On this view, the applied philosopher has an important role to play vis-a-vis his/her pure philosopher counterpart. He/she tests theory and hence adds a unique and significant contribution to the evaluation of theory. It is this testing role which the traditional analogy with engineering/physics overlooks.
>
> **Norman Bowie**

might be the view that the humanities are essentially formally academic disciplines whose only task is to preserve and advance the tradition of scholarship and learning. They are independent of, and essentially indifferent to, contemporary social and policy issues.

Each of those models, in addition to its concept of how the social sciences and policymaking ought to interact, has often something implicit, but now and then explicit, to say about how the individual social scientist ought personally to interact with policy analysts and politicians. They run the gamut from paid handmaiden, through cautious, somewhat wary relationships, to a resolute refusal to have any dealings at all with workaday policy issues or people. At stake are different notions of what might compromise the integrity of their own field, commitments, and training. Social engineers sense no threat to integrity at all. They are glad to have the opportunity to put their field to the services of policy. At the other extreme would be those who do not think any noncompromising relationship is possible at all; one should just stay away. In between are those who believe one can work virtuously in the marketplace if care is taken to avoid occasions of sin. One need only mention some applied humanities analogues: working for a legislator, but resisting a denial of moral principles in the name of political expediency; or writing a corporate history and refusing to suppress unsavory parts of that history.

Of these various possibilities, only that of the "engineering model" would seem wholly unacceptable for the humanist. It combines two ingredients most at odds with the nature of the humanities: an indifference to ends and a concern with means only, and a willingness to forgo critical distance in order to play the handmaiden role. While the humanities may have helpful contributions to make, for instance, to the choice of prudent means of implementing a policy decision, their full strength will most naturally lie in examining goals and purposes, and in testing them against its understanding of human nature, history, and needs. If that type of analysis cannot be done, or is even partially suspended, the heart is cut out of the possible contribution of the humanities. Similarly, to forgo critical distance and to put the humanities to the passive service of political power is to commit a grave moral offense against the humanities. Just as it is of their essence to be focused on the human situation, it is no less a part of that essence to refuse to compromise that mission.

There is perhaps a fine line only between the enlightenment and nonparticipation models. The distinctive note about the former would be its interest in policy matters and a desire to make some kind of contribution to them. It would hope that some general knowledge could be generated that would filter through and helpfully illuminate policy. The nonparticipation model, if it bespeaks disdain for public policy matters at the working level, should have little to commend it to the humanist. That is not to say by any means that all, or even most, humanists should be concerned as humanists with policy. It is only to say that an arrogant, or disdainful, dismissal of policy issues as beneath the dignity of the humanist would betray the civic mission of the humanities; and it would be almost as arrogant similarly to dismiss those in the humanities who choose to make policy their special mission.

The enlightenment and the clinical models emerge as the most feasible and potentially fruitful for the humanist. The

attraction of the former is that it is the most likely to allow the fullest scope to the training and insights of the humanities. It can take on policy matters, but without the constraints of meeting hard deadlines, doing the "quick and dirty" research that is a requirement of much policy analysis, or being unduly forced by political or practical constraints to rein in the imaginative possibilities. At the same time, it will not have some of the strengths of the clinical model, most notably the capacity of the latter to provide the humanist with direct access to decisionmaking settings and people, and to see at firsthand the consequences of trying to make use of knowledge drawn from the humanities.

Inevitably, of course, those who work in a clinical context will, in the immediate heat of moral struggles, often not have the time to do the deepest or best possible scholarship. Nor will they always have the same kind of freedom of expression, or possibility of elegance of expression, open to those who work at a greater distance from actual decisionmaking. That loss may be offset by the sense of immediacy and concreteness and by the possibility of making an immediate, palpable difference. There is, in any case, room for different personal interests and predilections, and thus no need for a forced choice among the various possible models.

Vision and Tradition

Whatever the model chosen it would be unfortunate if it slighted the creative and necessary tension between the past and the future, and between social constraints and social vision. That tension should be made manifest however the humanities are brought to bear on contemporary problems.

Counterpoised against a too commonly narrow and highly technical humanities is a long-standing ideal of the animating force of the humanities. It evokes and instills a deeply rooted social vision, one grounded in tradition, alert to contemporary need, and aspiring to a viable future. The past was the starting point, and the traditional humanities, the locus of that vision, were based on a canon of classics.[63] They were not without inner tensions, but those classics did present the approximation of an integrated moral world view. Modern thought, by contrast, has produced anticlassics and an anticanon. Today there are many who see no basis for giving any texts a preferential status, or any tradition either. No integrated world view seems available or desired. At the same time, there is great anxiety as to what might count as a basis for the wisdom and character of which the humanities have so long talked. If the humanities are to help with social vision it may not only be through the application of humanistic disciplines to specific problems of social policy. It may be also and no less significantly through a reappropriation of a fruitful relationship between the humanities and the practice of life, a task perennial and never finished.

Perhaps the easiest role to see for the humanities is the critical one, for criticism is a central part of the ethos of contemporary intellectual life and the university. And the humanities can, in part, provide us with a critical perspective on our own culture by holding up to us the image of another culture, whether real or imagined. That image allows us both to see the limitation of our own culture and to envision other possiblities. Lionel Trilling suggested that a classical educa-

tion—when in its last days it no longer had much connection with the practice of life yet still lingered on in schools and universities—played such a role. Of Freud, who kept his schoolboy diary in Greek, Trilling writes, "who can say what part in his self-respect, in his ability to move to a point beyond the reach of the surrounding dominant culture, was played by the old classical education, with its image of *the other culture*, the ideal culture, that wonderful imagined culture of the ancient world which no one but schoolboys, schoolmasters, scholars, and poets believed in?"[64]

Today there is no single "other" culture, no respected ancient world with which all educated persons are familiar—and not just with its dry contours, but with its myths, its heroes, its climactic historical moments—that stands in splendid difference and implicit criticism of our own. The student is inundated with other cultures that classicists, anthropologists, Sinologists, Indologists, and others are prepared to introduce to them. But the use of an elaborate critical apparatus may keep those cultures more distant than bring them alive. The enormous increase in our ability to reconstruct sensitively an extraordinary range of human cultures, both contemporary and historical, is certainly an important resource. Yet for all of its value it remains difficult for many to locate (or once located, to respond to) the roots of our own culture. How is it possible to have a sense of the continuity of those roots with our present life when the humanities become "disciplines" armed with "methodologies" and "critical perspectives" that frequently call into question the validity of any tradition? They cannot easily transmit a living memory; they often destroy it.

The modern individualist ideologies that dominate our consciousness and our universities can also be destructive of living memory and so of social vision. For the latter cannot be manufactured on the basis of present need or feeling alone, but always require an effort to discern what is good in itself and how that might be embodied. Tradition as living memory is not the mindless repetition of the past, but the creative reappropriation of the past in the context of present reality. Thus a sense of the past and a sense of the future are intrinsically related: if we destroy one we destroy the other.

One of the most demanding tasks for an applied humanities is that of finding the right balance between a useful response to present needs and the duty to put that response within the context of a tradition. Many of the most pressing social and policy problems arise in the context of rapid cultural and technological change. A popular, indeed predictable, feature of the ensuing public debate is that of a call for "new rules," a radical restructuring of past principles and perspectives.[65] A no less predictable counterresponse will be a fervent plea to protect the status quo, treated as sacred and unchangeable simply because it originated in the past.[66]

Yet no tradition can remain alive if it does not change over time. "New rules" cannot be viable unless they are permeated by those elements of the tradition that have stood the test of time and experience. An applied humanities would be a parody if it could do no more than generate new slogans and handy formulas. Its larger, more responsible task is that of enriching the present with the past, of complicating rather than simplifying reality, and of suggesting solutions that evoke complex and enriching visions.

5. *Fields of Application: The Biomedical, the Social, and the Policy Sciences*

In thinking about the various uses of the humanities, it is possible to envision and readily find examples of their direct application to individual social and policy issues. A no less important and related development has been a conscious immersion of many humanists into the work of fields whose characteristic focus has always been on such issues. There the question is not only how the humanities might relate to this or that discrete policy problem or issue, but more broadly how the general perspectives and methods of the humanities might best interact with the quite different perspectives and methods of other fields. It is possible to see in those broad interactions both an attempt to bring contrasting points of departure into contact with each other and to do so by means of the different "models" noted in the previous section. We will begin this section with relatively brief looks at the interaction of the humanities and the biomedical sciences, and the humanities and the social sciences. More extensive analysis will be accorded the field of public policy, or (as sometimes designated) the policy "sciences."

The Humanities and the Biomedical Sciences

For the past twenty years one of the most active areas of work in the applied humanities has been in the biomedical sciences. Scholars from philosophy, history, and literature currently teach in medical schools, conduct rounds and other educational exercises in hospitals and clinics, and engage in biomedical policy work at the state and federal levels of government.[67] There are programs in the medical humanities (literature and medicine,[68] bioethics, political theory) at a number of medical schools, and history of medicine departments have long been in existence at major universities.[69] The past twenty years have also witnessed an increase in the number of specialty journals and books devoted to topics in the philosophy of medicine and biomedical ethics, the history of medicine and nursing, and literature and the health professions.[70]

Medicine has long acclaimed the im-

portance of the humanities in educating physicians and other health care professionals. At the turn of the century, distinguished physicians such as William Osler called for greater attention in the medical school curriculum to the humanities.[71] Yet, from the beginning of the twentieth century, the eventually triumphant attempt to professionalize medicine was at odds in practice with the notion that the humanities have a critical role in medical education. The 1910 Flexner report and subsequent efforts to root medical practice in scientific methodology worked as an important counterweight to any role that might be played by the humanities. While medical educators and practitioners had hoped that an undergraduate liberal arts requirement would enhance the role of the humanities, that emphasis has been undercut by the increasingly stringent scientific demands (or a perception of such demands) placed on those who enter medicine.[72]

Nonetheless, the humanities have more recently been able to work cooperatively with the biomedical professions at the graduate and postgraduate levels in part because many practitioners are acutely aware of the failures of their training in adequately preparing them for the humane dimensions of medicine. In the 1960s, moreover, a series of scandals pertaining to a questionable or simply unethical use of human beings for medical research—at Tuskegee, Willowbrook Hospital, and the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, for example—forced the medical professions to pay serious attention to both normative and regulatory questions about their own work. At the same time, many scholars within the humanities were becoming increasingly interested in medicine.[73] The power and prestige of the profession, its social and economic impact and the unusually rich and complex set of historical and philosophical questions raised by technological advances, make it an attractive area of study (just as had been the case somewhat earlier with sociologists). This combination of circumstances produced a flowering of links between the humanities and biomedicine in research, teaching, clinical practice, and most recently the policy arena. In some places the medical humanities occupy departmental status within medical schools. At other schools single scholars have been appointed to do work in the various areas of the medical humanities. Many medical schools and undergraduate institutions have instituted specialized programs in philosophy, literature, or history that focus on biomedicine.

One of the most difficult issues is the degree to which those from the humanities ought to modify their traditional approaches to moral, valuational, or historical problems in light of the needs of biomedical practitioners. Many (but by no means all) scholars in the humanities are uncomfortable working by the bedside or in front of legislative committees, and this has led to intense discussion within the medical humanities about the appropriate styles and methods that ought be utilized by those working in biomedical fields.[74] Fear of co-optation or trivialism have led some scholars within the humanities to disparage teaching or research in the medical humanities (just as, analogously, some historians have avoided business history). Some medical humanities scholars themselves fear that a simplistic and mechanical application of moral theories to the problems that exist in medicine may distort the contribution that the humanities can make to the improvement of health care.[75]

Since medical educators often view the

Philosophy in a Clinical Setting

. . . In an attempt to allocate my time most effectively, I limit my work mainly to a few departments: internal medicine, family medicine, the division of neonatology in pediatrics, and nursing. Within these departments I attend a variety of meetings on a regular basis—attending rounds, work rounds, morning reports, chart rounds, noon conferences, case conferences, et cetera—typically taking up a total of twenty hours or more per week. In some of these meetings I mainly observe; in some I respond to questions or raise them; in others, I lead the discussion.

. . . It is not always easy to be a philosopher among physicians. As any philosopher knows, it takes time to sort out and describe issues, to propose and examine possible answers. As any physician knows, time in a teaching hospital is scarce. How does one determine when to raise a philosophical question, or what to say when invited to comment? There are several problems.

In the first place, as a philosopher my understanding of the medical facts may be shaky. If I use the twenty-five-words-or-less to which I confine myself to get clear about the facts, then I offer nothing philosophical and slow down the proceedings for no one's benefit but my own. If I offer comments without getting clear about the facts, I risk offering irrelevancies. Although this problem diminishes as I learn more about medicine and its language, it does not disappear.

Where I do offer a comment, I am sometimes uncertain about how to focus it. Should I present a quick overview of the general philosophical issues at stake (with no time to show very clearly how they relate to the case at hand)? Should I examine a feature or features of a particular argument someone has already offered (with no time to show why such an analysis has an important bearing on the broader question, and risking the perception by staff that I am trying to make the arguer look foolish—with no time to show that this is not the point of philosophical criticism)? The possibilities are numerous, none of them entirely satisfactory. Any comment that focuses on the broader issues risks being so general as to seem like a platitude or truism; any comment focusing on the particulars of the case at hand risks a kind of triviality or, perhaps worse, a failure to bring in that systematic kind of analysis that should be one of philosophy's greatest contributions to such discussions.

Finally, whatever the level of generality, I find it also difficult sometimes to determine whether my comment presents something familiar to the physicians, even trite, or a new, perhaps quite strange way to view the issue. I have spent many years immersed in a discipline that asks different sorts of questions from the sciences and that pursues its answers in rather different ways. It is a challenge to learn where these ways of thinking coincide and where they diverge.

E. Haavi Morreim

humanities as a source of enlightenment and sensitization for medical students, there has been a tendency on their part to emphasize goals such as improved communication skills, a broadening of perspectives, and evaluative analysis as the object of teaching. There are some in the humanities who would disagree with these goals, or at least find them too narrow. They view their primary task as that of communicating the methods and rigorous substance of their discipline to biomedical professionals. They often stress the value of the humanities in helping students to think more clearly and analytically, in allowing them to understand the social and political context of medical practice, and in helping medical professionals to define better the normative and policy problems that they inevitably will encounter in the course of day-to-day practice. Their concern, in short, is less with "sensitizing" and "humanizing" young physicians than it is with helping to develop specific cognitive skills and social perspectives.

One of the most significant recent developments is the appearance of humanities scholars in clinical settings. Philosophers and historians are now acting as ethics consultants in some hospitals and medical schools. They also serve on institutional review boards and ethics committees, sometimes interview patients, offer advice to attending health care personnel, and write reports on ethical issues that arise. Yet, since there is very little professional training in the humanities that prepare scholars to do this kind of work, their appearance in hospital corridors has led to the worry that the theoretical emphasis of most humanities education may not be the most appropriate way of preparing them

Against Philosophical Authoritarianism

Finally, I refer . . . to the upsurge of interest in medical ethics among philosophers and to the proliferation of courses offered by them in our medical schools. I view these developments with approval, but also with much ambivalence. On the plus side, philosophers can perform a much-needed service by bringing medical students and physicians to query the authoritarian and paternalistic traditions of the profession, traditions that need modification but that can never be altogether eliminated. But on the negative side, some philosophers fall victim to their own authoritarianism when they maintain that medical students and physicians can neither comprehend nor apply their professional ethic unless they are first drilled in the conventions, language and special methods of formal ethics. Apart from the practical fact that it is impossible to find a place in the already shamefully overcrowded medical curriculum for a detailed course in formal ethics, the conclusion that understanding of ethical matters can be achieved only by those who have traversed such courses is plainly specious.

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Philosophy As Therapy

I participated in numerous informal discussions with nursing staff on hospital policies and procedures with . . . success. The first summer I was involved in several sessions exploring the legal and ethical ramifications of a controversial consent form recently adopted by the hospital; analytic scrutiny of the document assisted nurses to sort out different issues implicit in the wording of the form. During the second summer, a program on humanistic gerontology provoked some discussion of a problem which had arisen in the Long Term Care Unit; patients were being forced to eat in the dining room, even though many resisted this, preferring the privacy of their rooms for meals. An enthusiastic new assistant director of nursing had decided that it would be beneficial for these persons to eat in a communal situation, "to bring them out of themselves." Some nurses bridled at this patent paternalism which ignored the patients' individual belief systems, values, and self-determination; others thought the true reason was economic, since it would be more cost effective for the patients to eat together. This issue provided me with an opportunity to compare and contrast three health care models: benevolent paternalism, consumerism, and existential advocacy. Subsequent discussion with the new assistant director and the nursing director of the Long Term Care Unit proved profitable. The decision was made to deal with each patient individually, to attempt to determine with each patient whether eating in the cafeteria would, in fact, benefit him or her.

As a consultant to the hospital staff, I found—much to my chagrin—that a number of nurses and aides would ask me for advice on multiple aspects of patient care, assuming, I suppose, that philosophers are very wise and thus have answers to perplexing questions. I usually attempted a Socratic approach with such people, trying to help them realize they already knew what was being requested from me. I found this was most effective in nurturing their own sense of personal power and perceptiveness and in conveying a sense of what philosophy is all about. Initially, a hospital philosopher must devote considerable time and energy to educating staff members into the nature of philosophy, gently debunking some of the myths

to take part in medical practice.[76] At the same time medical staff and students often indicate that it is just this difference in background that those trained in the humanities bring to clinical teaching that makes their presence valuable.

While there is certainly room for disagreement about the value and impact of teaching the humanities in clincial settings, there is reason to believe that those in the humanities have been highly successful at the policy level in influencing biomedicine policy and practice. They often serve on regulatory committees, national commissions and institutional review boards. They have testified before federal and state legislators, have been cited in court decisions, and have had a direct hand in the maintenance of various forms of institutional controls of the practice of medicine and the delivery of health care. The continued existence,

surrounding this esoteric discipline. This requires tolerance and considerable patience.

Finally, I was available, on a referral basic from attending physicians, to do "philosophical counseling" with patients and their families. Serious illness will often throw individuals into a questioning attitude regarding the meaning and purpose of human life. For some who have no traditional religious affiliation, a one-to-one discussion with a philosopher can lead to clarification of values and beliefs, a consideration of new conceptual options. Even those with conventional beliefs might profit from philosophical therapy. My function as a philosophical counselor was certainly not intended to conflict with the traditional pastoral counseling already available by local clergy but to complement it.

. . . Since the hospital had no staff psychiatrist, social worker or counselor during the first summer, I was occasionally called upon to deal with problems beyond the scope of my academic training in philosophy. Since I do have some rudimentary formal training in Gestalt psychotherapy, I was able to meet these demands in most cases. (I am currently pursuing a master's in social work to enhance these psychotherapeutic skills.) I am not convinced that the conventional bifurcation of philosophy and psychotherapy is correct. At its best philosophy serves a therapeutic, healing function, for it involves a clarification or an alteration of one's belief system, leading to richer experience and more efficient practical behavior. At one point I was asked to work with a young man who attempted suicide. Deeply depressed, he questioned the value of life, posing in an anguished way a perennial question of philosophy. We established rapport with one another, and he asked me to accompany him during the last week of my first summer to the state mental hospital to which he had committed himself. When he was released, even though I was no longer on the hospital staff, I continued to work with him—as did several psychiatrists, psychologists, and a hypnotherapist. He never was able to extricate himself from his torment. During the second week of my second summer's residency, he shot himself through the head with a pistol. Anyone who works in a hospital must be able to contend with this type of profoundly disturbing occurrence, even a philosopher.

Fraser Snowden

for example, of a national system of institutional review boards with oversight responsibilities for research on human subjects can be attributed in great part to persistent concern within the humanities. Humanities scholars played a central role in the work of the Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects (1974–1977) and the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1980–1983).[77]

The role of humanists in solving particular policy problems, and in serving as enlightened commentators on medical and health policy practices seems to have earned the humanities a degree of respect from social scientists, economists, medical administrators, and other traditional laborers in this area of policy-making. Certainly, those in the humanities have slowly learned tc cope with the

complexities of policymaking in the health care arena, and have begun to acquire the skills for doing work in this sector.

The Humanities and the Social Sciences

In many respects the humanities have a deeper affinity with the social sciences than they do with any other major branch of knowledge.[78] And yet, perhaps ironically, because of the close connection between their respective subject matters and concerns, there has almost always been a deep rivalry between the social sciences and the humanities. They have been sharply demarcated for many decades. Yet today there are signs that the intellectual segregation that has characterized their relationship is beginning to break down. New opportunities for cooperation and mutual enrichment are beginning to emerge. If this trend continues, interdisciplinary cooperation with the social sciences may provide one of the most fruitful avenues through which the humanities can regain contact with the important issues and problems of public life in our society.

Many obstacles stand in the way of this development, however, and the hopeful signs of cooperation between the humanities and the social sciences remain nascent promises yet to be fulfilled. The traditional tension and rivalry was produced by the historical development of the social sciences themselves and by the influence of positivism in both fields. The rivalry can best be understood if we recall that the social sciences, as separate disciplines and as autonomous modes of inquiry, were born out of a dissatisfaction with the humanities' inability to cope with the new social, economic, and political problems posed by modern industrial society; and out of a commitment to the positivist belief that it was possible to construct a nomothetic, predictive science of society and human behavior.[79]

Many of the early social scientists were humanists by training, but they abandoned the humanities in order to pursue a different mode of analysis and an investigation of much the same subject matter that the humanities studied.[80] Although a normative program of social reform was often the impulse that drove the early formation of the social sciences, eventually the positivistic tenets of value neutrality and scientific objectivity came to predominate professional self-identity. A fundamental division between the social sciences and the humanities settled on the basic distinction between descriptive and prescriptive inquiry.

In large measure, the new rapprochement between the social sciences and the humanities has been made possible by the decline of positivism and the attendant blurring of the hard-and-fast distinction between descriptive and prescriptive investigation. The interpenetration of the humanities and the social sciences that has so far occurred, however, has taken place mainly at the level of disciplinary study and theoretical investigation.[81] In the applied wings of the social sciences and the humanities much less contact has taken place. The applied social sciences remain strongly positivistic and quantitative in orientation (though that tendency has been much criticized of late).

While the applied humanities often draw upon social scientific studies in order to obtain a better sense of the

Social History and Social Policy

The historian's perspective on contemporary issues provided a sharp and vital sense of options, opportunities, and abilities to maneuver. As opposed to some social science research that appears better able to analyze the forces upholding a system than the forces that might promote change, the historians consistently analyzed the past record in ways that expanded the range of choices available to decision makers. In their work, the elements that compose the present situation appear to be far less determined and fixed. An aura of inevitability gives way to a sense of experimentation. Thus, the historian's sense of the contingencies that went into the construction of present policies and practices is a much-needed corrective to the more closed constructs of other disciplines. It is important that policy analysts and administrators recognize that the federal government funded a major health program in the 1920s, not because the precedent itself should be faithfully copied today but because the very notion of an alternative system is liberating.

To take this point one step further, historical analysis often serves to demystify a subject. It challenges one fundamental source of legitimacy—the notion that since an institution or practice has always been with us, it must necessarily always be with us. The dead weight of the past prompts inertia when survival comes to be confused with desirability. The historian can counter such an orientation, thereby stimulating attempts at change.

The historian's analysis is also well suited to explain the dynamics that shaped policies, to identify the critical elements in the decision-making process. Historians can work at the microlevel; sufficient records do survive in enough detail to provide historians with the necessary data on which to base such an analysis. Whether the case on hand be the organization of the hospital, the operation of a public pension system, or the presumptions that underlie urban design, the historian has much to tell the social policy analyst about the players, the strategies, and the rules of the game. To ignore such data is to miss some of the most illuminating and important moments in the implementation of social policy. . . .

Moreover, policymakers, in informed and uninformed ways, are already using history. But too fequently this history is an invented one; many administrators carry with them an image of the past that exerts a powerful influence on their design of programs. Both the long history of policy toward the black family and the short history of such a group as the Carnegie Council on Children demonstrate that, for better or worse, history is often integral to the formulation of public policy. Historians can, at least, help to make certain that policy people are using an accurate history. Furthermore, historians can bring their own sense of the past to bear directly on the framing of policy choices. It is simply not true that the nineteenth century was the golden age of family cohesion or that the black family totally disintegrated under slavery. And a policy that presupposes otherwise, may well be mischievous and counterproductive.

David J. Rothman and Stanton Wheeler

sociological and institutional context of the problems with which they deal, this often amounts to little more than the use of social science as a source of facts and information. Philosophers who work on professional ethics, for example, may familiarize themselves with the literature on the sociology of the professions, but they rarely integrate that literature into their work in any substantive or meaningful way. Applied historians, by contrast, are far more likely to do so. For their part, social scientists have been somewhat slow to recognize the value of normative analyses of professional ethics. They have consequently failed to investigate the way in which normative considerations and arguments have altered the concrete behavior of professionals in recent years. Hence, while the boundaries between social scientific and humanistic study are breaking down at the theoretical level, at the applied level the gap between these two branches of knowledge remains wide and yet to be bridged.

The humanities and the social sciences share a common subject matter and many overlapping concerns in their study of human activity. Both aspire to deepen and to broaden our insight into the multifaceted reality of the human condition. Both aim to expand the limits of our cultural horizons and to enrich our understanding of ourselves as socially and historically situated beings. Both take the realm of human artifice and performance as the primary locus of inquiry. They are thus both drawn to explore the meanings that adhere in the interactions among persons, the forms and conditions of those meanings, and the embodiment of ideas in texts and institutions which mediate the social relationships among individuals.[82]

In the pursuit of those common objectives, the humanities and the social sciences do of course differ in the categories they employ and in the themes they characteristically emphasize. The humanities tend to throw the particularity of individuals—their originality, their style, their creativity and causal efficacy as agents—into bold relief against a distant background of collective, historical, or material forces. For their part, the social sciences tend to highlight precisely those general background conditions and structures that both make individual particularity possible and serve to limit it.[83] Nonetheless, these differences are not so fundamental that they obviate the common ground that might link the humanities and the social sciences. Were this common ground better understood and more forcefully acted upon, the humanities' characteristic emphasis on human agency and the social sciences' characteristic emphasis on the context of agency might be reciprocally illuminating. That would allow each of these two families of discourse in concert to comment more intelligently on the human condition than either has been able to do separately.

Most, if not all, social scientific and humanistic disciplines have lately been caught up in a process of theoretical realignment and methodological turmoil, reflecting in part an uncertainty about the next steps in disciplinary development. We are entering a period of what Clifford Geertz has aptly called "blurred genres."[84] Disciplinary boundaries that once appeared firmly entrenched are beginning to break down, and new patterns of research are forming, based upon problems and metaphors that shuttle between and confound old dividing lines. Policy analysis, in particular, offers a fruitful common ground for joint work by humanists and social scientists.[85]

Public Policy and the Policy Sciences

The realm of public policy has perhaps attracted the most interest within the humanities during the past two decades. In part, that is because of a reaction against a technocratically based form of policy analysis and a desire to put something richer in its place; and in part out of a belief on the part of many that the voice of the humanities should be present in the wide-ranging national social, political, and economic debates that have been a mark of American life since the 1960s.[86] To this should be added a general perception that policy issues already reflect, and cannot evade, issues of meaning and value, history and future dreams.

A fundamental purpose of the humanities is to reflect upon the human condition, to explore questions of ends, meanings, interpretations, justifications, past memories and present purposes. How then can they fail to have something of value to contribute to the formation of public policy? A basic purpose of public policy is that of finding ways to devise a more human economic and political order, one sensitive to the demands of the past and its traditions, and to the future and its needs. How can that task not, in turn, be pertinent to the work of the humanities?

Yet those assumptions—of an ineluctable and natural bond between the humanities and public policy—have been challenged. That challenge has come from both the side of the humanities and that of policy analysis. From the side of the humanities, it has been said that they are not, of their nature, suitable for the resolution of the daily dilemmas of social, political, and economic life. The humanities seek not instantly usable practical knowledge of the kind needed to build bridges, balance budgets, or create jobs, but that deeper and different knowledge necessary for human self-understanding and reflected primarily in the great written texts of the past, whether historical, literary, or philosophical. As the principal vehicle by which tradition is kept alive, by which the ends of life are kept in the forefront, by which the heights and depths of human experience over time are kept before our eyes, the humanities speak to that which is most central and abiding in our life together. They do not speak to mundane policy issues.

Such a position—the argument continues—does not entail an indifference on the part of those in the humanities to matters of public policy. It only entails a distinction between the two spheres. The humanities cannot be true to themselves if they take on public policy issues, which are by their nature transitory, technical, and political. It is, moreover, pretentious and dilettantish for those in the humanities to believe they can effectively work with policy matters. They have neither the professional qualifications nor the practical experience to do so.[87]

Thus has a powerful argument been pressed by some in the humanities. The assumption of a fruitful relationship has been no less challenged by many within the policy sphere, though their stance is often more implicit than explicit. In a democratic system—so the argument goes—the political process determines the goods and values to be sought in society. While the question of what they ought to be is serious and basic, the role of policy analysis is to serve that system

> Literature can still help citizens to imagine what it is in public issues that they share: the personal basis for concern, the historical and cultural framework of the problems and values under consideration, the fundamental human qualities and purposes in disparate, even opposing views. Literature can help citizens to be thinkers-in-common; i.e., persons talking, however disparately, about an underlying set of values that derive from a common heritage and bear upon a common future. It can give words to aspects that will go on being important long after whatever policy decision under consideration has been made.
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> **Richard Lewis**

by helping it to function effectively. That is essentially a technical task, not philosophical or theoretical. Once a commitment has been made, for instance, to devise a welfare program for the poor, or an incentive system for capital investment, alternative strategies must be weighed to determine which policy option would best achieve that end, how the chosen option could be financed and implemented, and what criteria ought to be used in evaluating its effectiveness once in place. Those are not suitable tasks for humanistic perspectives and methods.

Such essentially technical tasks do not imply indifference to the larger questions of the human good. They only imply that some should have the training and experience necessary to implement the concrete practical details of those goals that society chooses; practical, not theoretical, reason is needed. Inevitably, the analyst must live in a world of trade-offs (a term that is not despised), seeking not the larger truths—a task best left to the sciences and the humanities—but those smaller truths that result from the give-and-take, the clash of values and interests, that are the stuff of daily life in a well-functioning, pluralistic democracy. That, in essence, is one common response from the policy side to an expanded role for the humanities.

Both the humanities and policy perspectives, in short, could share the belief that they are engaged in different enterprises and that each, in its own right, is valuable and worthy. They can also thus believe that their mutual tasks are best kept separate. Neither field will gain by merging the two enterprises, and society as a whole will not benefit by confusing two distinct realms of thought and activity; the result will be neither good humanities nor good public policy.

There is considerable persuasiveness in that line of argument. Seen in its best light, it bespeaks a desire to preserve the integrity of different spheres of activity. It tries to embody a recognition that they serve different, but equally valid purposes. It attempts to take seriously the view that the humanities and public policy will of necessity have different standards of excellence and craft, different methodological criteria, and different, though complementary, roles to play in the culture.

Nonetheless, for all of its power, it is a viewpoint that does not fully appreciate the possibilities that a closer relationship between the humanities and policy could bring. It is, at the least, a distortion of the policy process to understand it only as a technical, instrumental enterprise. It needs values, tradition, and social vision as part of its conscious and animating apparatus; and it cannot, in any event, fail to be soaked in values, however much unrecognized or denied in the name of technical neutrality.

A first step in making some sense of the possibilities is to observe that the

expression "public policy" is, in fact, much too loose to be of great help. Instead, we suggest that it is possible to distinguish among *public policy, public policy analysis,* and *public policymaking.*

Public policy can be understood as the aggregate collection of those actions undertaken by government, either by omission or commission, to advance the welfare of its citizens and the protection and advancement of its national interests. Those actions will embody social goals, purposes, and direction. In their totality, they encompass legislation, administrative regulations, court decisions, and other types of governmental action. Public policy can also encompass those possible actions that are deliberately omitted. While not everything that the government fails to do can be called a matter of public policy, there are a number of issues that work themselves into the public policy realm by virtue of the fact that a national debate, or a legislative or judicial ruling, determines that the government ought self-consciously to remain free of involvement with them. The debate over abortion, or other issues thought to be pertinent either to private morality or to the operation of the economic marketplace, would be examples here. In general, public policy will reflect the competition of values and interests, of tradition and modernity, of ideals and reality.

Public policy analysis can be construed as an analytical effort to devise the practical alternatives open to government in implementing public policy commitments. Its purpose has commonly been that of understanding the technical, bureaucratic, and legislative process by which policy is made, of studying the various possibilities of public policy initiatives, of exploring the potential consequences of different policy options, and of determining the most feasible means of achieving political, economic, or social goals. An essential purpose of policy analysis is to set the stage for policymaking. It is typically carried out by advisors or consultants to those who actually make policy.

Public policymaking is the actual act of making a policy choice, or of implementing a policy option. The understanding of public policy, or an analysis of policy choices, is not in itself to make or devise policy. Policymaking, by contrast, can be seen as the final outcome of understanding and analysis.[88] Decision, judgment, action, and choice are the dominant features. They will be part and parcel of the political process, encompassing struggles over different conceptions of the national interest and human welfare and reflecting the results of prior policy analysis. Policymaking will encompass bargaining, compromise, and a mix of high ideals and insistent reality.

Those distinctions concerning the realm of policy allow us to ask more specific questions about a possible role for the humanities. It might seem at first glance that the only, or most appropriate, relationship should take place in the arena of *public policy in general.* Indeed, it is at that level that the going is easiest and most congenial for those in the humanities. What ought to be the proper end of man and how ought public policy and government serve that end? What is a just society? How much freedom ought people to have? What ought to be the role of tradition in shaping political and social institutions?

At this level one can appropriately ask and grapple with the oldest, most enduring human questions, of equal concern both to the humanities and public policy. A notable feature of discussion and thought at this level is that there are, in

principle, few if any constraints, political or practical. One is free to envision any kind of society, to ask the deepest questions with no restraint save that of logic and assumed values, and to set aside, if one chooses, anxiety about practical outcomes or possibilities. In practice, of course, policy issues will ordinarily be understood within the context of a set of political limitations and traditional values; yet imaginative initiatives are always possible.

With *public policy analysis*, one moves into a somewhat different realm. Here one must begin talking about and analyzing particular and concrete policies. The question is less the nature of justice in general, but instead, the specific ingredients of a just economic, or immigration, or housing policy in this society at this time in history. If economic growth is sought, would tax incentives to real estate developers be an effective means of attaining it? Would harsher sentences reduce crime rates? While discussion in the realm of public policy can be directed to all, citizen and expert, policy analysis will more commonly be directed to those with specific responsibilities, administrative or legislative (to legislators, for example, who can vote tax benefits for real estate developers or set harsher jail terms for convicted criminals).

A notable feature of public policy analysis is that, to be responsible, it must recognize the existence of constraints; those who devise policy must work within legal and political boundaries. Yet the need to recognize constraints can create a problematic situation for those from the humanities. Their fields invite an expanded imagination, a leaping over of boundaries. But public policy analysis is carried out in actual societies. It must ask not only what might be ideal, but what is feasible; not only about tradition in general, but about the pertinence of particular traditions to particular problems. It must move from the highest theory to a different level, and out of the past and into the present and future.

Inevitably, public policy analysis must also move a step closer to action and away from contemplation and reflection. The "is" and the "ought" begin to jostle each other more closely. If he or she would work in this realm, the humanistic scholar must understand not just the great ideas and deepest memories, but must also grapple with contemporary facts and data. If a fair immigration policy is being sought, how many immigrants might be admitted under a policy that favored reuniting existing families versus one that favored granting a legal status to those now classified as illegal? What is the moral import of that data? Yet the necessity of considerable intellectual flexibility, of balancing competing demands, and of constantly testing theory against reality is one of considerable value to the humanist. It helps to challenge a bifurcation of facts and theory or the creation of concepts notable principally for elegance rather than for credibility.

Policy analysis is not yet a fully developed discipline, but a collection of techniques and approaches—including various statistical methods, computer skills, decision theory, microeconomic analysis, and organizational psychology—designed to tell certain kinds of stories and to fashion certain sorts of conclusion. Their larger aim is to assist and improve governmental decisionmaking about complicated problems. Its constructions of reality are shared to some considerable extent with economics, and at a more general level with the other social sciences, and shared also with a substantial number of policymakers at various

levels of government. Policy analysis is flourishing in the universities, with adequate enrollment of able students seeking governmental careers. Its professors consult widely; its students find jobs.

Those economists, political scientists, lawyers, and others who consider themselves policy analysts are generally optimistic. They expect that sophisticated techniques will be increasingly applied to complex problems, that careful estimates of social utility—of the efficiency and equity of public policy—will find a growing audience among the powerful. They also believe, on the whole, that the study of bureaucratic politics, and of organizations more generally, will identify removable or reducible obstacles to the intelligent deployment of public resources.

Yet for all its confidence, and its real success in improving the quality of governmental decisions, there has been continuing deep and thoughtful criticism of the dominant modes and attitudes of policy analysis. This criticism has helped open the way for the humanities. One of the main objections has been the narrowness of the approaches used. Utilitarianism is the dominant ideology among policy analysts, and this has in practice meant that cost-benefit analysis is a principal analytic mode. In such circumstances, economy and efficiency become almost privileged goals, chiefly because they are related to the most measurable aspects of people's needs and desires. Questions of equity concern policy analysts, but problems of definition and measurement tend to reduce the relative role of the former. Utilitarianism can account, perhaps inadequately, for legal or human rights; but it seems clear that dealing with these in cost-benefit terms is likely to distort and trivialize the issues.

Critics of mainline policy analysis often assert that the values associated with democratic political activity tend to be underemphasized, partly because of a reliance on markets in designing solutions of policy problems. Similarly, community values—especially those at odds with the national, rationalistic, and economic goals—are likewise said to be less often taken seriously by policy analysts. These problems are particularly evident in the courses on methods and techniques offered by the public policy shools and programs; and the humanities offer a potential corrective.[89] Serious substantive policy work, including courses that study policy problems in some depth, is ordinarily somewhat less narrow in its outlook. Members of policy faculties who have shared some or all of these misgivings have over the past several years moved to broaden the range of subjects and perspectives considered in the teaching of policy analysis. More policy problems have been studied in the light of relevant history, and a concern with ethics—little more than embryonic in most policy programs ten years ago—has won some measure of legitimacy in the field. The importance of values has been reasserted. As Garry D. Brewer and Peter deLeon argue, "human values are the crux of the policy sciences; problems for analysis are guided by the society at large, not the theoretical inquiries of the scientific disciplines."[90]

It is hardly surprising that work in history and public policy has been especially strong in the area of foreign policy. How could serious work on our relations with the Soviet Union proceed without reference to the memories that still shape policy, or to options chosen and those foreclosed by previous decisionmakers? Under the guidance of the historian Ernest May, at Harvard, faculty members

in at least fourteen institutions have been developing and testing cases designed to sharpen the teaching of history in relation to policy. The "Uses of History" project has put the burden of its effort into foreign policy questions, but cases have also been written on decisions by domestic policymakers and political leaders. That kind of historical work has several values. It can give policymakers examples and images that will help them to recognize crises, to make more accurate and more careful use of historical analogies, and to envisage the costs of insufficient information and the consequences of some kinds of failure. Using real cases rather than hypothetical ones has an important added advantage. The information can help students develop some of the knowledge they should have, but usually do not, about American and world history.[91]

Historical cases narrowly focused on particular policymakers and their decisions may appear too limited, closer to the aspects of history claimed by the social scientists than to what is properly placed within the humanities. It seems, however, that in the hands of competent historians, the histories can have broad and surprising implications, challenging ordinary ways of thinking, illustrating dominant values, suggesting the uncertainties of choice, and showing the con-

The Risks and Benefits of the Historical Perspective

I am glad of the chance to speak to [this Congressional subcommittee] as a professional historian who has reflected a great deal about how history might guide policymakers in all areas of their responsibility, even in the especially complex area of immigration and population.

Though I am enthusiastic about this committee's receptivity to the historical perspective, I must begin with a note of warning. Turning to history for guidance is very likely to mislead you. That is not the fault of history, but of the way it is too frequently seen and used.

It is difficult to imagine a decision that any of us takes which is not shaped by certain assumptions about the past, but we normally take a very simplistic view of what history teaches, and lead ourselves into error.

Professional historians are hardly error-free, but we can tell you that when you ask what our past teaches about heavy in-migration to the United States, especially as that becomes a touchy political and policy question, the easy answers you are likely to get may be quite wrong.

. . . Two very widespread contemporary assumptions, probably valid throughout our historical experience, are now, it seems to me, untenable; things have changed.

The first of these assumptions is that the influx of additional population is beneficial to American society. . . .

The second assumption which our history implants in the contemporary mind is equally false. That is: those who oppose large-scale immigration, who

trolling influence of an ideology or a point of view. An overwhelmingly weak historical sense was evident in the first strong flowering of policy analysis. Its principal mark was a devotion to scientific and rationalistic methodologies; it sought precision and the authoritative backing of science. But there was a price to be paid for that predilection—a loss of touch with concrete human reality.

Yet policy analysis is "analysis" and not final choice or decisionmaking. It is still thinking and not acting. Accordingly, *policymaking* is the arena of action. Here elected and appointed officials fashion and make policy, pass legislation, issue rules, and pronounce juridical decisions. In one sense, that is the realm most remote from the work and traditions of the humanities. It is not at first glance the realm of scholarship, or great texts, or reflective interpretation.

But it is in this arena, finally, that one would most hope to see the cultural force of the humanities, to see whether actions taken reflect high values, display well-tutored moral and historical sensibilities and vision, and advance human welfare and self-understanding. Here "expertise" disappears or is subordinated to values and interests, ideologies and politics. Knowledge is important, but no less important are character and vision. If it is true, as sometimes said, that the people

raise the immigration issue as a subject for "viewing with alarm," must be today, as they were in the distant past, bigots and nativists who did not wish to make room for people different from themselves. But here, too, things have fundamentally changed. . . .

Thus, I would suggest that our history on the immigration issue is a poor guide for contemporary policymakers. The past is often misleading, if we simplistically assume that it repeats itself. . . .

But is there no more that the historian can tell you, beyond that some things have changed, and that the most prominent of these—the population/resource/environmental relationship and the source and nature of contemporary restrictionism—have transformed the issue and require us to look at it in a new way?

Yes, there is much more that can be derived from thinking historically . . . Among other things, the historian can tell you that immigration, unlike most aspects of life, comes to possess a sort of self-renewing momentum.

It tends to perpetuate itself, since immigration more than most human activities is a creature of habit, cuts grooves within which chains of families and friends spread the word that leads to uprooting and movement across national borders.

History most decidedly shows that national policy can interrupt these flows, but the longer one waits to impose resolute policy in this area, the more difficult it becomes. . . .

Thinking historically, rooting one's judgments firmly in a historical context, means much more than merely remembering a string of discrete facts in some chronological order.

The study of the past encourages a holistic view, the integration of isolated issues in the relevant context, and I would urge this upon you.

Otis L. Graham

get the kind of leaders they deserve, then their moral and social formation will show in the kinds of legislators they elect to represent them. If, in one sense, the humanities have the least technically to contribute at the actual policymaking level, in another sense they can have everything to do with the formation of the viewpoints, perspectives, and character of those who actually make the decisions. Those who teach the humanities will have a powerful opportunity to influence future citizens and policymakers; how their sensibilities and thinking are shaped will not be inconsequential for the future of a society.

As this brief survey suggests, there is no reason why there cannot be a plurality of legitimate ways and places for humanists to interact with policy questions and with those who will fashion policy. Yet some hazards must be avoided. The first is that they not play the handmaiden role. There must always be some critical distance between the humanities and the policy process. The second is that humanists not succumb to pretentiousness, either that of believing they have the final wisdom and that theirs is the purer life and vocation, or that of thinking that their disciplinary work has an elegance, thoughtfulness, and rigor that are infinitely superior to the muddling through of the policy process.

Those in the humanities who would grapple with policy issues need on occasion to gain a first-hand taste of political life. The purpose of this would not primarily be to gain credibility in the eyes of those who work out in the world of politics and policy (though that would not hurt), but in order to gain self-understanding and to test the limitations and possibilities of their own disciplines. Professors of humanities are among the few academics who rarely traverse much beyond the academy. Yet they should do so on more occasions, if only because they need to have their own imaginations and disciplinary potentialities stretched. A steady diet of confronting only students and their colleagues may leave humanists intellectually anemic, far more prone to note and comment on each other's work than on those larger human questions that usually provided the fundamental motivation behind their initial attraction to the humanities.

If it is true that much policy analysis and policymaking are in essence oriented toward action, then it is surely possible to agree that there are some basic differences between the sphere of the humanities and that of policy. Nonetheless, there are always two important contributions the humanities have to make. The first is that of the formation of character. The humanities have a central and indispensable role to play in helping by means of insight and understanding to form the traits and virtues necessary for citizens to make sound and sensitive judgments. If policymaking is an art, oriented toward action, then inevitably character, fundamental sensitivities, and basic human decencies will count heavily. The second contribution is that of providing alternative perspectives, frameworks, and vision. An inherent hazard of policy analysis and policymaking is to neglect the larger schemes and problems of human life in order to solve immediate problems and meet short-term demands. The humanities, by reminding citizens of tradition, of ends and purposes, can provide an important and necessary corrective.

6. *Academic Preparation and Disciplinary Standards*

If an applied humanities is to have a viable future, it will be necessary to devise more effective means of educating students to manage the difficult demands that good work requires. Many who now work in applied humanities have had to find their own way, usually lacking any special academic preparation for the applied part of their work; and they have ordinarily also lacked informal tutoring and collegial support. Effective work in applied humanities requires a variety of skills, many of which can seem to be in conflict with each other. As a minimal requirement, a solid education in a humanities discipline is necessary; and sometimes an education in two or more disparate disciplines. The applied humanist must simultaneously demonstrate disciplinary mastery of his or her own field, and yet be able when necessary or desirable to express that mastery in an idiom or way different from the characteristic of the discipline. His or her disciplinary education must be complemented by an understanding of the social, cultural, and political forces that provide the context in which applied humanities must be pursued in actual life and society. Sociological and psychological acuity and sensitivity are critical.

Many of those in applied humanities will move back and forth between an academic and a nonacademic milieu, and between disciplinary and applied work; some will work outside of the academy altogether.[92] There must, then, be an ability to maneuver in different worlds, and to adopt those stances and strategies appropriate to each. Inevitably, diplomatic, oral, and interpersonal skills will come into play for the humanist working outside of the university context—or working within it with those whose disciplinary methodology, and academic styles, are considerably different from those in the humanities. These various demands point to the need for graduate or other training programs that are not less, but more, demanding than for standard academic work in a humanities discipline. Considerable intellectual flexibility and emotional suppleness will be required. That can best be gained by a combination of standard academic training and internships or clerkships designed to impart a range of practical skills to complement intellectual ones.

At present the overwhelming majority of those teaching in applied programs are themselves graduates of traditional programs in the humanities. Many if not most have never been employed outside the university. For the most part they have had to acquire experience in applied work through self-training or interdisciplinary collaboration with colleagues from other departments and schools within their universities. That gap in faculty grounding may disappear within the next few years as more scholars begin to engage in applied activities

such as consulting, contract work, and full-time employment for nonuniversity employers. In some programs special efforts have been made to hire new faculty members who are themselves graduates of applied programs and have therefore spent some time doing applied work. But the overall number of humanities scholars with this background is small. At least in the immediate future the bulk of teaching and research in applied humanities programs is likely to be conducted by scholars whose background and socialization in the humanities falls outside the scope of applied work.

The movement toward a greater emphasis on applied work in the humanities has already resulted in some changes in the curriculum of both humanities departments and professional schools. Carnegie-Mellon, Bowling Green State University, Georgetown University, the University of North Carolina, the University of California at Santa Barbara, the University of Colorado, and the University of Tennessee have all instituted programs that allow a student to obtain an advanced degree in applied philosophy or history. The Claremont Graduate School offers a dual degree program in business and one of the humanities (M.B.A. and Ph.D.).

Those programs usually require a student to take both standard courses in their discipline and specialized courses geared toward practical or policy work. To provide the student with first-hand experience they often also require students to particiate in internships for periods that can range from one to six months in a business, hospital, government agency, or private organization. The goal of these programs is to give students both theoretical and practical skills that will allow them to work either as teachers at the undergraduate or professional school level or, more often, as specialists in tandem with those in business and government. The programs are relatively new; it is thus difficult to know with any certainty whether graduates are in fact able easily to locate such positions.

Many additional schools are now considering instituting special graduate programs with their humanities departments. In some cases, the motive seems to be primarily financial. Yet shrinking enrollments in traditional humanities courses, and hopes for better job placement for graduate students, are not in themselves persuasive rationales for instituting specialized graduate programs in any area. The reality of the present economic situation is that there is for the most part little interest on the part of nonuniversity-based employers in hiring scholars trained specifically in the applied humanities. Moreover, there are no signs of an emergent stronger market in the universities. This situation would seem to indicate that, at present, no need exists for the creation of additional specialty programs in the applied humanities. Moreover, there are a sufficient number of such programs already in existence to afford those interested in pursuing studies in this area a number of educational options.

Some existing programs have tried to achieve a healthy balance between training in applied areas and traditional curricular offerings. Faculty members in many departments have stated that the creation of specialty programs on applied subjects has proven to be of real value for those students and faculty engaged in traditional work. Many in the faculty of the University of North Carolina's history department, for example, report that the creation of the program in public history has provided an opportu-

nity for dialogue between faculty members doing applied and theoretical work that has been mutually beneficial to both varieties of scholars.

On occasion those involved with specialty programs in the applied humanities have been tempted to weaken course requirements in traditional areas in order to accommodate new offerings on applied subjects. But work in any area of the applied humanities requires that students be given a solid foundation in the basics of their discipline. Students ought not be asked to sacrifice traditional training in order to acquire practical skills. It would be preferable to add additional coursework and internships to the existing course of study already required of graduate level students. That requirement points toward the need to lengthen rather than to cut the amount of time spent in graduate training.

Practical experience of the kind to be obtained through participation in an internship in a nonacademic setting is also a valuable component of sound preparation for applied work. Since effective work in applied or policy work is often a function of more than academic qualifications, programs in all areas of the applied humanities should closely monitor student performance in order to help students develop the necessary social and communications skills requisite for such work in many settings. Faculty must realize and acknowledge to their peers and to prospective students that personality and interpersonal skills and, on occasion, intellectual entrepreneurship play important roles in determining who is and is not likely to fare well in applied work. (That, of course, would be comparatively more true of those choosing to pursue a "clinical" role, say, than that of an "enlightenment" approach.)

At the same time, the applied humanities should not be seen by faculty members as a dumping ground for those who cannot meet the requirements of traditional programs in the humanities. The applied humanities should be an acceptable option for those who show interest and aptitude. There are now many scholars devoting all or at least some of their research and professional work to issues in the applied humanities who would not be doing so if they had not encountered a course in this area during their graduate training. The quality of work available on applied topics in philosophy, history, and literature has surely grown to the point where every graduate program in the humanities ought to offer at least one course in this area.

Humanities departments also need to be open and flexible in order to accommodate students who are attempting to do advanced level work in applied areas. Since practical experience can play such a critical role in the education of those in applied areas, departments should be flexible in allowing students to take courses or internships outside traditional departmental settings. Flexibility is also necessary in order to help students design courses of study that meet both existing departmental standards and the requirements of interdisciplinary or interprofessional study. Many departments—such as the philosophy departments at Michigan State University, Brown University, Dartmouth College, and Case Western Reserve University—have constructed special programs and interdisciplinary committees to supervise the work of students who would like to pursue advanced studies in applied areas of philosophy.

While the focus of this report has not been on the employment situation of those employed outside of the university, we should mention a point that sur-

The Moralist as Expert Witness

Courts of law have permitted expert moralists to perform functions ranging from description of community mores, to metaethical analysis of terms and modes of argument, to substantive resolution of normative problems. In the past, this has occurred with little controversy and little recognition that such testimony might present unique problems not presented by more familiar types of expert testimony. It seems likely, moreover, that resort to expert ethicists and moralists will increase as advancing technology, especially in the medical and biomedical sciences, poses human problems never encountered before. Further acceleration may come from the increased readiness of other branches of government to assign major roles in ethical decisionmaking to individuals and groups believed to be expert at moral and policy analysis and from the general trend of courts and attorneys in favoring expert testimony of all sorts under the helpfulness standard. Thus, careful examination of the issues posed by expert ethical testimony is essential. . . . certain types of ethical testimony are far more problematic than others. For example, the law of evidence poses little obstacle to any type of descriptive testimony on questions concerning the morality or immorality of acts or policies according to specified ethical systems, the morality or immorality or acts of poli-

faced repeatedly during our project. Many of those unwillingly forced by economic circumstance to work outside the university report either indifference or hostility to their situations by those still within the academy. They are given neither sympathy nor support, and only rarely are they invited to maintain contact with their university colleagues (or would-be colleagues). Though a milder phenomenon, many within universities who have come to concentrate on applied work report coolness and sometimes scorn on the part of colleagues.

None of these attitudes are productive or helpful. Those working in applied humanities outside of the university need the support and nourishment of those within. Those doing it in the university need the help and standards of their disciplinary peers. Each has something the other can give; and they will be stronger working in a friendly way with each other than in working alone.

Academic and Disciplinary Standards

At the heart of the uncertainty about the uses of the humanities is that of appropriate standards of quality and discipline.[93] Can an "applied humanities" meet customary disciplinary norms? Ought it to try? If not, what might alternative norms be in the application of the humanities to issues outside of the ordinary disciplinary sphere? Many of those who have chosen to focus their efforts in applied humanities have sometimes felt the scorn and suspicion both of their disciplinary colleagues and of those outside the humanities as well. For their part, they often respond with ambivalence. They want to be taken seriously by their peers; and yet, at the same time, they often feel that the standards of evalua-

cies according to most or all moral systems, or the morality or immorality according to contemporary standards in given communities. Expert analysis also may reveal lack of agreement among moral systems about particular questions, leaving the court free to draw its own conclusions. Similarly, metaethical functions such as assisting the court with respect to moral reasoning or analysis seem relatively uncontroversial.

The case is much closer, however, with respect to the ethicist's normative functions—declaring certain actions or rules right or wrong absolutely or determining that one individual rather than another ought to be entrusted with making a moral decision. Review of leading schools of ethical and metaethical thought suggests that expert witnesses drawn from their ranks could serve as acceptable witnesses. Although these various ethical schools analyze moral problems differently, and at times come to disparate conclusions, lack of unanimity need not pose an insurmountable barrier. After all, courts continue to find expert testimony from warring schools of psychiatry, medicine, and art criticism helpful. Yet disagreement on moral questions may exceed that found in other areas, and for that reason, a court might well exclude normative testimony on "state of the art" grounds.

Richard Delgado and Peter G. McAllen

tion being applied to their work are not appropriate and can actually be highly unfair.

What, then, ought to be the standards in attempting to do work in the applied humanities, and in judging the quality of that work? An immediate difficulty in answering that question is that there are any number of possible roles that those with training in the humanities can and do now play. They can use their humanistic discipline to attempt to solve policy or other social problems. They can employ their humanistic background to provide, not solutions, but simply different perspectives and uncommon ways of framing issues. Humanistic training can be also used in a brokerage role, that is, by showing people outside of the humanities that there exist traditional humanistic resources capable of providing them some assistance; and then helping them to make use of those resources.[94] Occasionally, the humanities can be used to provide an antidote in the policy sphere to what seem to be excessively technocratic, or bureaucratic, approaches to problems. Here the humanities play the role of the critic, proposing not so much alternative ways of doing things as a different perspective on the way things are already being done. In short, just as there are a variety of ways for the humanist to work in a public policy or public arena, so too a variety of different standards will be appropriate to those different settings. No single standard is likely to be pertinent to all of them.

There is no doubt that an effort to take the humanities outside of the standard academic disciplinary context encounters a number of problems and temptations.[95] There is a basic worry about whether there will be an erosion of scholarly standards and of an appropriate detachment. Work that is generated by outside clients or at the instigation of others, or situations in which

advocacy seems called for, or where the desire for immediate visible and accessible relevance is strong, all can tempt one to dilute or adulterate the humanities. Inevitably, a philosopher discussing issues of medical ethics with physicians will be forced to speak in a somewhat different manner, and in a somewhat less technical way, than he or she might with his or her own colleagues in philosophy. At the same time, the philosopher could make very little contribution to the physician if there was an insistence upon exactly the same language and standards of rigor appropriate in an exchange with a philosophical colleague.

In part, of course, the same problem is encountered when someone in the humanities teaches, say, a freshman level course, where it is not possible or sensible to proceed in exactly the same way that one might deal with graduate students or at a professional meeting. In part also, those nonhumanities professionals who are the recipients of whatever the humanities may have to bring do not have exactly the same needs as a more general audience. Physicians are interested in knowing the contribution that the humanities can make to the care of patients, and policy analysts are often concerned with specific policy issues. Both groups will be concerned principally (as professionals) with the possibilities of application to the issues they encounter rather than the more generally enrich-

The Assumptions and Goals of Work in the Applied Humanities

The philosophers who have addressed the moral implications of public policy issues have had several goals. At a minimum they have sought to provide intellectual clarification—resolving ambiguities and exposing unnoticed premises and assumptions that occur in public debates over moral issues. A more ambitious goal has been to provide moral arguments for particular positions on these issues, arguments that meet certain standards of coherence, consistency, and logic. These arguments do not necessarily differ radically in nature from those that might be put forward by scholars and other disciplines or might be encountered in journals of opinion, but they have tended to have certain unusual strengths: a critical and questioning approach to received opinion on moral principles; an interest in insuring that the moral premises used in a particular argument cohere with other basic beliefs and hence are part of a unified moral outlook; and a relative lack of partisanship and stridency. These qualities are nothing more than standard virtues of good scholarship; what is unusual is their presence in writing on ethics. The shift in philosophical practice has been premised on the thesis, now somewhat more widely accepted than it was a decade ago, that logic and reasoning are as important in moral debate as in science or other scholarship.

Moral philosophy, then, has endeavored to improve on intuition and sloganeering in an attempt to justify moral views on other than an ad hoc basis; when successful, it has provided rationales rather than rationalizations. These efforts have, however, met with considerable skepticism, both from critics outside of phi-

ing aspects of the humanities that might interest them in their lay role. This is not to say that those in the humanities may not simultaneously stress the more enriching aspects. It is only to say that, in order to make the contribution that can be made, they must inevitably find a way to speak in terms, and with a focus, pertinent to the needs of those to whom they talk.

Arnold Eisenberg, in his introduction to a reissued version of John Dewey's *Theory of the Moral Life* noted how Dewey managed to move back and forth among different levels: "Some passages, befitting the difficulty of their subjects, are more difficult than others; some, too, are exceptionally difficult because Dewey has not seen quite through his subject; but all alike, and in equal measure, represent a student talking to students, a philosopher to philosophers, and a vexed human being to his fellows."[96] That is a tribute of a kind to which anyone working in applied humanities could well aspire.[97]

A good deal of applied work requires the crossing of disciplinary lines. Thus the interdisciplinary character of the work means that some hybrid set of standards often needs to be developed, drawn from those fields to which the humanities address themselves, and from the fields of the humanities as well. Inevitably, it is far more difficult to devise standards for a mixture of two

losophy and from philosophers who were never convinced that the turn to practical issues should have taken place. . . . [Among these doubts] is the feeling . . . that philosophical work on these issues is simply too far removed from mundane reality to have any practical import. Even when engaged in "applied" work on social questions, philosophers typically make numerous idealizing assumptions, speak at a high level of abstraction, and close up shop before spelling out many practical implications of their arguments. The policymaker or interested citizen may be left with the conviction that reading the philosophers' essays cannot effect the decisions and judgments routinely encountered in professional or civic life. . . .

The very qualities of philosophical [writing] that prompt these doubts may also, however, be seen as strengths. Philosophical writing on moral issues aims to improve, in certain respects, on day-to-day ethical reasoning. The chief difference is that we ordinarily take no special pains to insure that our moral judgments are systematic. On occasion we back up our moral views by reference to moral rules, such as the doctors' "First, do no harm." Rarely do we try to defend these rules, or to resolve a conflict among rules, by referring to higher order principles. This is ordinarily just as well, for most of us would quickly find that our moral outlook is not organized according to any consistent principle or set of principles. The assumption underlying much philosophical work on current moral issues, however, is that a reasoned, comprehensive theory of social morality may be achievable; or, at least, that this ideal may be approached much more closely than is usually assumed. To the extent that this goal is pursued, the scope of intuition and ad hoc rationalization is reduced, and at the same time the debate is focused upon the most basic issues underlying the public debate.

Daniel Wikler

fields than it is for work within one field alone. They are more likely to be characterized by an acceptable process than by a test of outcomes. One must simultaneously try to satisfy different standards, and frequently enough what will satisfy one will not satisfy the other. That is an inescapable tension, but one that will vary with context.

Nonetheless, despite the context-dependent nature of any viable standards for applied humanities, some general norms can be suggested. First, those who attempt to convey the knowledge that the humanities have gained ought to do so in a way that does not compromise the complixity, uncertainty, or nature of the knowledge being conveyed. While it may not always be pertinent or possible to transmit the fullness of disciplinary rigor, it is important that the need for rigor be noted and exposed; that listeners be informed that problems are often more difficult than can be conveyed in brief summaries; and that the findings of the humanities ought to be taken as secure or insecure depending upon the solidity of the evidence and argument available to support them. It is acceptable, indeed necessary on occasion, to find ways of speaking in nontechnical terms, and of adapting the insights and knowledge of the humanities to audiences without professional background in those fields. What is not acceptable is to ignore, or to pass over without notice, the fact that there may be debates and complications within the humanities on those topics, and that in the end there are no simple ways of dealing with many of them.

Second, it will be vital for those in the humanities working with other fields and disciplines to maintain their own critical detachment. While a principal purpose of the applied humanities will be to serve public and social needs, those needs cannot be allowed to manipulate, or alter, the standards of what counts as good work in the humanities. In particular, while a stance of advocacy is by no means always inappropriate, it ought to be made clear that the taking of such a position must not be done in ways that harm good scholarship, or the necessity for integrity in seeking the truth.

Third, there will be occasions when an effort must be made to advance the state of humanistic scholarship in particular areas of public life and public policy. In those cases, the full rigor of a disciplinary approach will be appropriate, and it will not be possible to allow those who are doing such work to evade customary disciplinary standards. In other words, if there is a desire to deal in a strictly historical or philosophical way with a difficult issue of public policy, then that issue must be dealt with in the light of the highest standards of those fields. It will, of course, not always be possible readily to distinguish among efforts to advance a technical argument, to simply perform a bridging function between the humanities and other fields for the sake of clarification, or to provide humanistic knowledge for the general background enlightenment of those working in professional or public life. The categories will often overlap, but the important point is that the appropriate standards for the nature of the work ought to be determined by those in the humanities and then rigorously respected.

There is probably no way that those doing work in applied humanities can avoid encountering or evoking the suspicion and reservations of their more discipline-oriented collegues. By working with issues that are perhaps not common to those colleagues, or of little interest to them, and doing so in ways that may

depart from the standard styles or norms of academic discourse, they will be inviting criticism. The attraction of applied humanities in part is that of breaking stereotypical notions of "good scholarship," of implicitly protesting on occasion at the narrowly scholastic framework of much disciplinary work, and of finding a way to keep alive and vigorous the possibilities of the humanities to illuminate contemporary life and issues. Too rigid an adherence to disciplinary norms will dissipate those possibilities; too lax an adherence runs the risk of trivializing and debasing the humanities.

Particularly in the policy area, an applied humanities must seek to genuinely address a social issue in the terms in which it arises; but it must simultaneously try to respond to the real and perhaps hidden or repressed needs that generate the issue. The very process of bringing humanities perspectives and methods to bear may necessitate a redefinition of the issues, just as it may generate conflict with those from other disciplines. If they are to be helpful, the humanities should on occasion generate debate over appropriate policy interpretations and strategies; their perspectives are likely to be different. At the same time they must struggle with the dual temptation to reduce the issue to one manageable by standard disciplinary means (what might be termed "disciplinary reductionism"), or to limit the humanities' role to adding a faint cultural polish as an afterthought. Those from the humanities, in other words, will have to struggle on occasion as much with themselves as they will with others. Both struggles are equally important.

7. *The Humanities: Hopes, Problems, and Needs*

A popular belief is that science has the unique task of and capacity for defining and characterizing reality. The "reality" at the heart of that belief is empirical: that which we see, feel, and hear; and that which, with enough investigation, can be codified in elegant theory, verifiable laws, and predictable futures. Properly modified and manipulated, the realities discovered by science can be turned to the improvement of human life. An equally strong belief is that the humanities do not deal with reality at all. Their domain is the imaginative (literature), the speculative (philosophy), the spiritual (religion), the traditional (history), or the evocative (rhetoric or linguistics).

There is enough truth in those popular conceptions to give them a certain credibility, and often enough within the fields themselves. The humanities make no claims about their ability to devise empirical probabilities about the agitations of matter; and the sciences do not pretend to offer interpretations of comedy and tragedy. Yet the unhappy consequence of the dichotomous notion of "reality" underlying the supposed gap between the sciences and the humanities is to relegate the humanities to a lesser, not altogether potent role in our society. Their residual handmaiden task has been to provide palatable meaning and reassuring succor in the face of a world properly (even if sometimes hazardously) changed, manipulated, and modified by the powerful engine of science and technology. On occasion, to be sure, the humanities may be expected to adopt the stance of the prophet, calling a forgetful and wayward people back to their roots and originating values. But even that role is one of response and reaction, not control and initiation. That is not a reassuring or invigorating picture. In response, a powerful motive behind the fresh rise of an applied humanities has been a desire to change the balance of intellectual power and initiative. A wide range of questions have been placed on the agenda of the humanities.

Must the humanities relinquish the future direction of human life to the sciences? Need the allegedly soft insights of the humanities defer to the putatively hard data of the empiricists? And should not the canard that the humanities have staked out the realm of the "soft," and the sciences that of the "hard," itself be laid to rest? Ought not the humanities believe that theirs is the stuff of vigor, potency, energy, and initiative? Do not the humanities have the capacity to offer modes of understanding and analysis that can change our dreams and visions, and thus our history? Do not the humanities tutor our imaginations to dare the belief that meaning can be found and sense made of things? Do they not commend us to continue, whatever the negative odds, the search for moral wisdom,

aesthetic sensibility, and political community? Do they not, in brief, forever challenge comfortable notions of just what counts as "reality," endlessly pushing us to those deepest and most ultimate questions that can finally and only be addressed by the humanities?

To each of those questions the applied humanities have responded with an enthusiastic cheer of affirmation. On occasion the enthusiasm no doubt runs away with itself, losing touch with the more enduring traditions and cautionary tales that have undergirded the mainline work of the academic disciplines. On occasion as well, the adulteration brought by ideology, political tendentiousness, self-righteous hectoring, and trendy hypes have induced doubts about the integrity of the interest. The partial justice of such accusations should not, however, obscure the powerful belief in and commitment to the humanities that is at the heart of the effort to find a way to reassert their indispensable value in human affairs.

The task that Congress specified in establishing the National Endowment for the Humanities remains fundamentally valid, that of fostering a constant human movement back and forth among the past, the present, and the future—the traditional, the pragmatic, and the utopian. If the humanities preserve the legacy of humankind in the great texts of the past, they no less provide ways to set the demands of the present against a dead hand from the past; and to help know the difference between the living and the dead. If the humanities provide the makings of a vision of the future, they can also provide the moral constraints that would refuse to sacrifice the rights and dignity of the living for the sake of those to be. Yet the humanities also provide the ingredients to struggle against that radical form of narcissistic individualism that would ignore the lessons of the past or the moral, sometimes self-denying demands of the future.

That complex dialectic of vision and criticism, of enthusiastic hope and sober analysis, of tight logic and bold imagination, allows and invites the fruitful application of the humanities to human affairs. It allows it by a denial that the humanities are irrelevant to either ordinary lives, on the one hand, or to the highest matters of state, on the other. It invites it by an affirmation that without the intervention of the humanities—that is, without the filtered and refined knowledge and wisdom contained in the great texts—neither private lives nor public affairs will have the kind of guidance they urgently require.

To keep that guidance at too great a distance—confined exclusively to the classroom, the professional meeting, or the scholarly journal—risks turning the legacy of the humanities into a too-precious, too-delicate flower, fit to be viewed only under glass. Yet the guidance, to be fully effective, must take care that it not wholly close the distance between the humanities and the flux and flow of daily life, public or private. For if they are to serve well, the engaged detachment that is a mark as well of the humanities must be allowed a full play—engaged because the subject matter of human life in its richness and complexity is too serious for any other stance, but detached in that the aim is depth and understanding, not merely immediate reaction and spontaneous feeling.

The special difficulty and challenge for those who would pursue an application of the humanities will be to preserve a sensible and sensitive balance. They will have to do justice to the humanities in the full rigor of the best possible scholar-

ship. They will have to know when, and how, to adapt that legitimate demand to the need for public intelligibility and literary felicity; and to do so without compromising the scholarship. They will have to discover how to become passionately involved with those social, cultural, and political issues that invite the contribution of the humanities. They will also have to learn how to curb that involvement when necessary, saving it from an uncritical response that would compromise the integrity of the humanities. They must learn how to prod, or nag, or goad, the disciplinary humanities to recollect their animating origins, and their potential bite and impact beyond the academy. They must also be willing to speak sharply against an application of the humanities that is nothing more than a faddish baptism of this or that currently popular cause or value or a thoughtless service of transitory power.

That is a large and difficult set of demands, not at once made instantly compatible or congenial. Its joint achievement requires constant work and self-criticism. No less necessary will be a constant interchange among those in the different branches of the humanities, and between those in the humanities and those in other disciplines; and then with the general public. All the while there must be a constant mindfulness of those human aspirations and needs that have forever fed the humanities: to make sense of things, to find out how life should be led, and to discover that which should be hoped for and how it ought to be pursued. No one should ever be able to say that the goals of an applied humanities are easily attainable. Instead, they call the humanities to a new level of demand, one filled with hazards, but no less filled with high possibility, both for the present and the future.

Notes

1. This report does not directly explore the contributions of the humanities to the life of the individual. Instead, our particular concern is that of their role in the common, public life of society. That emphasis should in no way be construed as a desire to slight the valuable place of the former. The humanities will significantly influence society through their shaping of the character, mind, and imagination of individuals.

2. See Memorandum of December 3, 1980, from Joseph Duffey, former Chairman of the NEH, to "Members of the National Council of the Humanities and Others," which also contains relevant excerpts from the Heritage Foundation Documents.

3. Richard Wasserstrom, " 'Justification' and State Humanities Programs," *Federation Reports* 2 (June 1979): 29–36.

4. While not denying the pertinence of the humanities to public policy issues, William J. Bennett, Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities, has been critical of a tendency by some to believe "that the humanities can be applied on a case-by-case basis to resolve political controversies and improve social conditions" (from "The Public Life of the Humanities," paper delivered on January 14, 1983, to American Conference of Academic Deans). See also Robert Hollander, "Serving Two Masters," in VHEPP, Newsletter of the Virginia Foundation for the Humanities and Public Policy, Winter 1981–82; and, by the same author, "State Committees Should Emphasize 'Real Humanities,' " *Humanities Report* 4 (February 1982): 2–3.

For some more general discussions of the nature of the humanities, cf. Walter Kaufmann, *The Future of the Humanities* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1977); O.B. Hardison, *Toward Freedom and Dignity: The Humanities and the Ideal of Humanity* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1972); Ernst Cassirer, *The Logic of the Humanities* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960); "The Future of the Humanities," *Daedalus* (Summer, 1969) and "Theory in Humanistic Study," *Daedalus* (Spring, 1970); Michael Mooney and Florian Stuber, *Small Comforts for Hard Times: Humanists on Public Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); R.S. French and J.D. Moreno, *The Public Humanities* (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, 1984).

5. A good account of the relationship between the National Endowment for the Humanities and the State Humanities Councils on the subject of the humanities and public policy can be found in Todd S. Phillips, "The Humanities and Public Policy, or: Whatever Happened to a Worthy Idea?" *Federation Reports* (January–February 1983), pp. 20–27. In its 1970 reauthorizing legislation for the NEH, Congress said that the humanities should be studied "with particular attention to the relevance of the humanities to the current conditions of national life." Quoted in Morton Sosna, "National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH)," in Donald R. Witnah, ed., *Government Agencies* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 334.

6. Arthur C. Danto, "Toward a Definition of the Humanities," *Proceedings of the General Education Seminar*, Columbia University, 9 (1981): 9–14.

7. Quoted in Robert Hollander, "Serving Two Masters," p. 1.

8. Carleton B. Chapman, "On the Definition and Teaching of the Medical Ethic," *New England Journal of Medicine* 301: 12 (September 20, 1979): 630–34.

9. See, for example, M. Lilla, "Ethos, 'Ethics' and Public Service," *The Public Interest* 63 (Spring 1981): 3–17; P. Drucker, "Ethical Chic," *Forbes*, (Sept. 14, 1981) pp. 159–63; J. Peter Euben, "Philosophy and the Professions," *Democracy* 1 (April 1981): 112–27; and C. Noble, "Ethics and Experts," *Working Papers* 7 (July/August 1980): 57–60.

10. This section is particularly indebted to Martha Nussbaum's paper, "Historical Conceptions of the Humanities and their Relationship to Society," in Daniel Callahan, Arthur L. Caplan, and Bruce Jennings, eds.,

Applying the Humanities (New York: Plenum Press, forthcoming, 1985).

11. For detailed studies of the cultural transformations that took place during the Athenian "enlightenment" of the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. see: Werner Jaeger, *The Ideals of Greek Culture*, 2nd ed. 3 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945); Arthur W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960); and Eric A. Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1967).

12. For a discussion of the complex relationship between the public and the private missions of philosophy in Plato's work see Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), pp. 28–68.

13. Cf. Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, pp. 69–94.

14. Nussbaum, "Historical Conceptions of the Humanities and Their Relationship to Society."

15. For surveys of renaissance humanism that have guided the very general assessment offered in this report see Nicola Abbagano, "Renaissance Humanism," in Philip P. Weiner, ed., *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, 4 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), 4: 129–36; and Peter Herde, "Humanism in Italy," in ibid., 2: 515–24. These articles give basic bibliographical references to the vast scholarly literature on this period.

16. J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). Cf. also Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), who, in contrast to Pocock, emphasizes the Stoic rather than the Aristotelian influences on Renaissance humanism.

17. Nannerl O. Keohane, *Philosophy and the State in France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

18. The relationship between Renaissance and Reformation thought is pursued in greater detail in David Little, "Storm Over the Humanities: The Sources of Conflict," in *Applying the Humanities*.

19. The clearest and most extreme formulation of this perspective was developed in the work of Thomas Hobbes. Cf. J. W. N. Watkins, *Hobbes' System of Ideas* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1968).

20. The general issue of individualism and the humanities is explored more fully in Robert N. Bellah, "The Humanities and Social Vision," in *Applying the Humanities*.

21. See Lionel Trilling, *Sincerity and Authenticity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972); Isaiah Berlin, *Against the Current* (New York: Viking, 1980), pp. 1–24, 80–110; and Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 3–50. For a more complete account of the philosophical sources and implications of romanticism, see M. H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953) and *Natural Supernaturalism* (New York: Norton, 1971).

22. Cf. Quentin Anderson, *The Imperial Self* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).

23. P. O. Kristeller, "Philosophy and Learning," *Minerva* 18 (1980): 313–33.

24. Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (New York: Cambridge University Press), p. 22.

25. This topic is pursued in greater detail in Bruce Kuklick, "The Professionalization of the Humanities," in *Applying the Humanities*.

26. See Carol S. Gruber, *Mars and Minerva: World War I and the Uses of the Higher Learning in America* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975).

27. Laurence Veysey, "The Plural Organized Worlds of the Humanities," in Alexander Oleson and John Voss, eds., *The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1979), pp. 51–106.

28. James M. Gustafson, "Basic Ethical

Issues in the Bio-Medical Fields," *Soundings* 52 (1970): 151–80; and L. B. de Graaf, *Survey of the Historical Professions: Public Historians* (Washington: American Historical Association, 1981).

29. Douglas Sloan, "The Teaching of Ethics in the American Undergraduate Curriculum," in Daniel Callahan and Sissela Bok, eds., *Ethics Teaching in Higher Education* (New York: Plenum Press, 1980), pp. 1–57.

30. For some indications of the possibilities for applied ethics growing out of this tradition (broadly defined), see: Frederick A. Olafson, *Principles and Persons: An Ethical Interpretation of Existentialism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967); William F. May, *The Physician's Covenant: Images of the Healer in Medical Ethics* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1983); and the special issue of *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 9: 3–4 (1983) on "Ethics and Social Theory."

31. Cf. Charles L. Bosk, *Forgive and Remember: Managing Medical Failure* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); and Renée Fox and Judith Swazey, *The Courage to Fail* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

32. Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).

33. See Bruce Kuklick, *The Rise of American Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 572: "Like most academics, philosophers spent their time in administration, in committee work, in placing graduate students, in organizing conferences, and in running journals. When narrow professionals turned to their scholarship, they thought of their work as a game. For a few, professional philosophy had become a way, not of confronting the problem of existence, but of avoiding it."

34. Cf. Carl Wellman, "Ethics Since 1950," *Journal of Value Inquiry* 6 (1972): 83–90.

35. Marcus G. Singer, "Recent Trends and Future Prospects in Ethics," *Metaphilosophy* 12 (1981): 207–23.

36. Louis I. Katzner, "Applied Philosophy and the Role of the Philosopher," *Applied Philosophy* (Fall 1982): 31–38; and Daniel Wikler, "Philosophical Perspectives on Access to Health Care: An Introduction," in the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, *Securing Access to Health Care*, 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983).

37. Stephen Toulmin, "How Medicine Saved the Life of Ethics," *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine* 25 (Summer 1982): 736–50.

38. See, for example, Norman E. Bowie, "Applied Philosophy: Its Meaning and Justification," *Applied Philosophy* 1 (Spring 1982): 1–18; and Bernard Gert, "Licensing Professionals," *Business and Professional Ethics Journal* 1 (Summer 1982).

39. See Jerome B. Schneewind, "Applied Ethics and the Sociology of the Humanities," in *Applying the Humanities*.

40. Arguments concerning this point can be found in Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre, eds., *Revisions: Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).

41. William F. May, "Professional Ethics: Setting, Terrain, and Teacher," in *Ethics Teaching in Higher Education*, pp. 205–41.

42. This section draws upon the paper by Fred Nicklason, "Applied Humanities Inside and Outside the Academy: A Personal Case of Applied History," in *Applying the Humanities*.

43. Peter N. Stearns, "Applied History: Policy Roles and Standards for Historians," in *Applying the Humanities*.

44. See Ernest May, *Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1973); Seymour Mandelbaum, "The Past in Service to the Future," *Journal of Social History* 11 (1977): 193–205; Peter N. Stearns, "History and Policy Analysis: Toward Maturity," *The Public Historian* 4 (1982): 5–29; David F. Trask, "Historians and

Teamwork: The Case of Crisis Management," *American Historical Association Newsletter* 19 (1981): 6–7; Joel A. Tarr, ed., *Retrospective Technology Assessment* (San Francisco: San Francisco Press, 1977); James McCurley, "The Historians' Role in the Making of Public Policy," *Social Science History* 3 (1979): 202–207; Joel A. Tarr, "Changing Fuel Use Behavior and Energy Transitions: The Pittsburgh Smoke Control Movement, a case study in historical analogy," *Journal of Social History* 14 (1981): 561–88.

45. See the journal, *The Public Historian*.

46. Michael C. Robinson, "Retrospective Management Analysis: A Test Case," *Public Works Historical Society*, 1981, pp. 4–5; Thomas W. Riley and John G. Adorjan, "Company History—A By-Product of Good Records Management," *ARMA Quarterly*, October 1981, pp. 5–8; Dan J. Forrestal, "Playing It Straight with Company Histories," *Public Relations Journal*, February 1978, pp. 27–28; Alexander Barrie, "Why Sponsor a Company History?" *Business World*, December 1977, pp. 15–16; G.D. Smith and Laurence E. Steadman, "Present Value of Corporate History," *Harvard Business Review* 6 (November–December 1981): 164–73; Margaret Price, "Corporate Historians: A Rare but Growing Breed," *Industry Week*, March 23, 1981, pp. 87–90.

47. See "Special Issue on Applied History," *Journal of Social History* 14 (1981): 533–738.

48. David J. Rothman and Stanton Wheeler, eds., *Social History and Social Policy* (New York: Academic Press, 1981).

49. On the relationship of applied history to advances in conventional history, see Michael Kammen, ed., *The Past Before Us* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980).

50. For an informative discussion of the problem of "quick and dirty" research, see Mark H. Moore, "Social Science and Policy Analysis: Some Fundamental Differences," and the response by Kenneth Prewitt, "Subverting Policy Premises," in Daniel Callahan and Bruce Jennings, eds., *Ethics, the Social Sciences, and Policy Analysis* (New York: Plenum Press, 1983).

51. We are particularly indebted to Martha Nussbaum for her contribution to this section.

52. Cf. Robert Gorham Davis, "The New Criticism and the Democratic Tradition," *The American Scholar* 19 (Winter 1949–50); and George H. Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), chap. 3.

53. For a provocative discussion, see Gerald Graff, *Literature Against Itself: Literary Ideas in Modern Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). For a more detailed assessment of the New Criticism and its legacy, see Frank Lentricchia, *After the New Criticism* (Chicago: Univerity of Chicago Press, 1980).

54. Cf. the issue of *Critical Inquiry* (September 1982) devoted to "The Politics of Interpretation."

55. Ronald Dworkin, "Law as Interpretation," *Critical Inquiry* (September 1982), pp. 179–200; and Stanley Fish, "Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in the Law and in Literary Criticism," ibid. pp. 201–16. Cf. also Sanford Levinson, "On Dworkin, Kennedy, and Ely: Decoding the Legal Past," *Partisan Review*, Vol. LI, No. 2 (1984), pp. 248–64.

56. This section is particularly indebted to Edwin T. Layton's paper, "Theory and Application in Science and the Humanities," in *Applying the Humanities*.

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86. This section draws upon the papers by Bruce L. Payne, "Policy Analysis and the Humanities," and Daniel Callahan, "The Humanities and Public Policy," in *Applying the Humanities*.

87. See William J. Bennett, "The Public Life of the Humanities."

88. A member of our editorial committee, Otis Graham, Jr., believes that "policymaking" should be understood as the basic category and should thus not be conflated with what was described above as "public policy."

89. Cf. Joel L. Fleishman and Bruce L. Payne, *Ethical Dilemmas and the Education of Policymakers* (Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Hastings Center, 1980); David G. Smith, "Policy Analysis and Liberal Arts," in William D. Coplin, ed., *Teaching Policy Studies* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978), pp. 37–43; Martin H. Krieger, "The Critique of Poor Reason: Using Literature to Teach Analysts," *Policy Analysis* 5 (Fall 1979): 505–20; William C. Havard, "Policy Sciences, the Humanities, and Political Coherence," in Francis Canavan, ed., *The Ethical Dimension of Political Life* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983).

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